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In 1966, amid hostile concerns and myths, the process of collective bargaining entered the university system of higher education.

A

dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from the
industrial revolution, it was intended not as an alternative to the traditional governance mode of the academy, but rather as a supplemental
mode to support the advancement of faculty rights (Polishook, 1982).
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The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members
with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions
of higher education to evaluate whether or not they perceive the process
of collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to
participate in institutional governance.
The population of the study consisted of 694 faculty members holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions during the spring of 1984.

Those faculty members selected for the

study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during the
academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for a
minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track appointment
in the department.
The research instrument "A Questionnaire to Study Collective
Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance" was used to measure for faculty members' perception
of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in their
university system in three major areas:

(1) Respondent Information,

(2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.
For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in
institutional governance.

The four hypotheses were:
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H:1

The collective bargaining process has affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an appointment in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

H:2

Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year
institutions of higher education, has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making
process related to the economic interests of the institution.

H:3

Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining the institution's educational policy on academic issues.

H:4

Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and
personnel policies of their employment.

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to test
each of the four hypotheses of the study.

Although statistically

significant differences at the 0.05 level were found within each dependent variable subset of data:

(1) professional interests, (2) economic

interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies, the four hypotheses of the study were rejected.

The data, how-

ever, suggest that the respondents at all three of the subject institutions perceive collective bargaining to have provided for (1) a formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making and (2) the
opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of
(a) dismissal for cause and (b) grievance procedures.
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These are important results, even though the aggregate data
suggest that academic collective bargaining in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education has not been perceived as having provided
faculty members with the right to participate in many institutional
governance issues.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary American university system emerged in the 1960s
as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influence,
as well as a substantive concentration of resources and multipurpose
capacity (Sherman & Loeffler, 1971; McHugh, 1973).

As an enterprise,

the university system was described by Clark Kerr in 1963 as:
A major producer, wholesaler and retailer in the knowledge
industry, which was inextricably related to national growth
and the

w~ll-being

of society, as well as a major instrument

of societal purpose (Kerr, 1963).
During the "era of growth" in the university system of higher
education, the role of university teacher was professionalized.

This

status provided the academician with the professional autonomy
required to participate in academic governance through (1) the setting
of performance standards, (2) the regulation of terms and conditions
of employment, and (3) the setting and regulation of academic
standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate education
(Shulman, 1979).

Furthermore, the academician's right to shared

authority, as the traditional mode of academic governance, was
developed and sustained in higher education, according to J. Victor
Baldridge because:
(a)

Faculty had the direct flow of its members into
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administrative positions;
(b)

Departmental members developed educational programs for
students and faculty, hired faculty, and set the standards
of performance.

(c)

Academic senates were formed to provide for influence/advice
to the administration in institution-wide matters
(Baldridge, 1982).

While the administration and faculty members were firmly
committed to the concept of shared authority in the higher education
enterprise, it was a brief golden age for the traditional mode of
academic governance (Garbarino, 1973, 1975).
The mid-1960s brought a combination of contextual factors, both
external and internal to the university system, which affected the
governance structures and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1973).
Among these factors were three major events: (1) the increase in
campus size and in the number of colleges and universities,
(2) increased financial problems, and (3) federal regulation that
reduced the faculty members' influence in academic governance through
departmental or campus-wide structures (Shulman, 1979).
By 1966, as a consequence of these events, academic collective
bargaining emerged as a supplemental governance mode for the academy.
It was a mode of governance that was not intended as an alternative to
the traditional governance forms of the university system but rather
as a supplemental mode that would guarantee the advancement of faculty
governance rights (Polishook, 1982).
A dynamic social process, grounded in a labor movement dating
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from the industrial revolution, collective bargaining has made
enormous gains in higher education (Nelson, 1982).

During the past 17

years, amid initial hostile concerns and myths, the process has
increased in public and private 4-year institutions of higher
education.

As Irwin H. Polishook (1982) stated:

"The proportion of

academic professionals who have voluntarily joined unions is greater
than the proportion of other Americans who have joined unions
(Polishook, 1982; Nelson, 1982).
In the university system, the growth of academic collective
bargaining has been assured because of a well-defined legal
environment, with established laws as the basis for

f~deral

and state

sector employee negotiation (Hedgepeth, 1974). Although federal sector
bargaining laws are an important part of the legal framework, the
enactment of state regulative laws, which include comprehensive and
permissive legislation, is of particular significance to education,
according to Joseph W. Garbarino:
Education is a function basically of the states.

While the

degree of encouragement among states varies greatly,
permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the
burst of academic unions of the late 1960s and early 1970s
(Garbarino, 1973).
By 1973, Oregon was among the original eight states to have
enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws for the educator as
a public employee.

These laws permitted faculty members with an

appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education to
select collective bargaining as a supplemental mode for their
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participation in institutional governance (Garbarino, 1973).
That choice has been confirmed by educational analysts such as
Aussieker and Garbarino, Baldridge and Lee as the mode of governance
adopted by academicians to improve or reinstate independence into
their professional lives (Shulman, 1979).

Furthermore, the recent

scholarly works of Lee, Polishook and Kemerer/Baldridge have continued
to support the position that faculty members have gained or maintained
a substantive role in academic governance as a result of institutional
unionization (Lee, 1979; Polishook, 1982; Baldridge, 1982).

As

Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979:
Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers through
the union contract.

Even on campuses where faculty have

enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract
legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty's
governance rights (Lee, 1979).
In 1982, J. Victor Baldridge identified four positive trends in
the formal governance rights of faculty members in university systems
with academic collective bargaining.

These trends, which support the

formal governance powers gained by unionized faculty, are:
(1)

The collective bargaining process standardized procedures in

personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits to
them identified as: (a) order to the system, and (b) increased
equity.
(2)

The collective bargaining process helped the economic status

of the profession.
additional money.

The bargaining process seems to have generated
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(3)

The collective bargaining process resulted in the so-called

"dual track" relationship between faculty senates and unions,
whereby senates serve faculty members' academic interests and
unions serve their economic concerns, remaining viable at campuses
that have both unions and senates.
(4)

The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to the

"decentralization" of administrative powers and authority
(Baldridge, 1982).
Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher

educa~ion

supported the rights

of faculty members for participation in institutional governance?
Purposes and Problems of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the faculty members
with academic appointments in Oregon's

4~year

unionized institutions

of higher education to evaluate whether or not collective bargaining
supports faculty members' rights to participate in institutional
governance.

To achieve the stated purpose, the following problems

were investigated:
1.

Have the professional interests of those academicians with an
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education been affirmed through the collective bargaining
process?

2.

Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians'
participation in financial planning and policy-making related

6

to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year
institution of higher education?
3.

Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining those institutional educational policies
related to academic issues?

4.

Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty
members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education
with the opportunity to participate in determining the
academic and personnel policies of their employment?
Hypotheses of the Study

For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in
institutional governance.
H:l

The collective bargaining process is perceived as affirming
the professional interests of the academician with an
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education.

H:2

Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year
institutions of higher education, has provided for the
academicians' participation in the planning and
policy-making process related to the economic interests of
the institution.

H:3

Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
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4-year unionized institutions of higher education
participate in determining the institution's educational
policy on
H:4

academ~c

issues.

Collective bargaining has provided the faculty

~embers

in

Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and
personnel policies of their employment.
Scope of the Study
The population of the study consisted of selected academicians
holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized
institutions in the spring of 1984.

Those faculty members selected

for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment
during the
present

1983~84

institu~ion

academic year, (2) have been employed in the
for a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on

a tenure track appointment in the department.
The questionnaires for this study were sent to 694 faculty
members with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions
during the spring of 1984.
Data for the study were collected from the population of the
study between May 21, 1984, and August 10, 1984.

The research

instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As A
Process Adopted in Oregon's

4~Year

Institutions of Higher Education to

Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional
Governance," was used for the data collection (See Appendix A).
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Definition of Terms
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions of the
major terms have been used:
1.

Collective Bargaining -- Means the performance of the mutual

obligation of a public employer and the representative of its
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to employment relations, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party.

However, this obligation does not compel either party to agree

to a proposal or require the making of a concession (Oregon, 1982).
2.

Institutional Governance -- The formal structure and related

activities that are used to make decisions affecting organizational
relationships, procedures and policies (Duryea, Fisk, et al., 1973).
3.

Academician -- An educator who holds an academic appointment

in a 4-year institution of higher education.
4.

Academy -- A 4-year university/college of higher education.

5.

Contextual Factors -- These are a combination of issues, both

external and internal to a university system of higher education, that
affect the institutional governance structure and function (Garbarino,
1973).
6.

Professional Interests -- A stature, gained during the 1960s,

which provides the academician with the right to pursue the three
central elements of the traditional academic model:

(1) research,

(2) peer evaluation, and (3) scholarship, as well as the right to
autonomy in setting professional standards and regulating thp. terms
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and conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979).

(See questionnaire

items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, ?6, 27).
7.

Economic Interests -- In a university system, faculty members

are expected to participate, either directly or indirectly through
structures of self-government within the institution, in the
determination of policies and procedures related to economic issues.
There are three types of such issues, those related to:

(1) the total

resources available to the institution, (2) the distribution of
resources allocated to provide for the academician's economic security
(e.g. salary, fringe benefits), and (3) the allocation of resources to
major budgetary categories.

(Brown, 1969; Wollett, 1971) (See

questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36).
8.

Educational Policies

Are the written policies within a

university system that govern the implementation of such academic
issues as curriculum, degree requirements, or professional teaching.
(See questionnaire items: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43).
9.

Academic and Personnel Policies -- Are provisions in the

academicians' employment agreement related to a wide spectrum of
bargaining subjects in the university system, which include such
issues as academic duties, standards, personnel policies, and support
services.

(Wollett, 1971) (See questionnaire items:

48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56).

44, 45, 46, 47,

Chapter II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The University Enterprise
The Contemporary University Setting
The late 1950s and virtually all of the 1960s have been described
as the "golden years" of prosperity for American higher education
(Garbarino, 1973). It was an "era of growth," which Joseph W.
Garbarino in 1973 described as the direct result of a combination of
factors external and internal to the system of higher education.

The

factors included:

An increase in the college-age population, the continued
growth in the proportion of the relevant age group attending
college, the international scientific and technological
competition touched off by the successful Soviet satellite
launching in 1958, and the competition among states to provide
university centers to facilitate the growth of science-based
industry combined to expend university budgets and - because
of relative shortage of experienced faculty - to expand
salaries and prerequisites (Garbarino, 1973).
As a consequence of phenomenal growth, by the 1960s, the
university system emerged with societal influence, as well as economic
and political importance (Sherman and Loeffler, 1971).
Clark Kerr, in an address at Harvard University, stated:

In 1963, W.
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We are just now perceiving that the University's invisible
product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in
our culture, affecting the rise and fall of professionals and
even social classes, of regions and even nations (Sherman and
Loeffler, 1971).
Therefore, the contemporary American system is best described as
a corporate institution or social system (McHugh, 1971; Lipset,
1975).

It is a system that has developed into a diverse and complex

structure, with no single organizational form (McHugh, 1971).

For

while some private and public institutions have all their faculty
members and staff located on one campus, others are widely separated
geographically (McHugh, 1971).
Furthermore, the university system is composed of highly
disparate elements (Lipset, 1975).

Although most 4-year institutions

of higher education have adopted research on the basic value of the
academy, its traditional characteristic functions -- research,
teaching, and public service are combined to provide for the
acquisition, transmission, and application of knowledge in various
degrees and for various programs (Lipset, 1975; McHugh, 1971).
Academic Professionalism
In order for the American system of higher education to meet the
expected societal performances as an institution, diverse
professionals are appointed to teaching positions within the academy.
These appointments bring together the lives and works of the best in
each field to form a "colIUllunity of scholars," (t-1cHugh, 1971) a
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community that through the years has established traditions for the
academy--traditions that have formed the academic model of higher
education based upon the value and practice of academia.
The academic model of professionalized university teaching
embodies three central elements:

(1) Research is an important

endeavor and the force of the university life, (2) academic work
requires peer judgment, and (3) scholarship is a vocation in its own
right (Shulman, 1979).

The model brought a status that, according to

Carol H. Shulman (1979), provides the academician with a new stature.
Professional prestige grew as scholars assumed more influence
over areas for which they claimed expertise:

(1) the academic

standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate
education, and (2) terms and conditions for faculty
employment.

These gains furthered their concept of

professionalism by allowing:

(1) autonomy in setting

standards of performance, and (2) in requesting the terms and
conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979).
Academic Governance
The culture of the academy by the 1960s further reflected the
professionalism of higher education, with the academician role within
the university community defined as both a participant and employer.
This culture set the standards to which all academicians in general
may aspire, that a faculty, in a broad sense of the word, function as
a responsible corporate body (Duryea and Fisk, 1973; McHugh, 1971).
As James B. Conant, the former president of Harvard University, said:
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This tradition, also developed in the medieval university,
prevails in a large measure in the university of today.

For

in an institution which is a university, in fact as well as
name, the teachers are members of a body with vast powers and
commensurate responsibilities ••••

The autonomy of the

institute rests fundamentally on the autonomy of each faculty,
which embodies in its spirit and action the university
tradition (McHugh, 1971).
Therefore, the concept of shared authority became the guiding
principle for the development of the academic profession (Duryea and
Fisk, 1973).

It was a trend that, according to Robert E. Fisk and E.

D. Duryea:
Stamped the services of the professionals, making them
inherently more than employees and strengthened the ancient
ideal of the university as primarily an association of
academicians (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).
In 1966, these principles were concisely articulated for the
academy in the "Statement on Governments of Colleges and
Universities," which was jointly formulated by the American
Association of University Professors, the American Council on
Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and
Colleges (Haslam, 1974).

This Statement called for a mutual

understanding regarding the governance of the academic institutions,
stressing shared responsibility and the proper interrelation among the
constituencies of administration, faculty, and, to some extent,
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students (Brown, 1969; Haslam, 1974).

The appropriate scope of the

academician's participation in the academic governance of an
institution was defined in the statement as follows:
(a) The faculty has primary responsibility for such
fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter, and methods
of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of
student life that relate to the educational process.
(b) The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees
offered in courses, determines when the requirements have been
met, and authorizes the president and board to grant the
degrees thus achieved.
(c) Faculty status and related matters are primarily a
faculty responsibility; this area includes appointments,
re-appointments, decisions not to re-appoint, promotions, the
granting of tenure, and dismissal.
(d) The faculty should actively participate in the
determination of policies and procedures governing salary
increases.
(e) The chairman or head of the department, who serves as
the chief representative of his department within an
institution, should be selected either by departmental
election or by appointment following consultation with members
of the department and of related departments; appointments
should normally be in conformity with the department members'
judgment (Sands, 1971).
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Furthermore, the statement stressed that the principle of shared
governance is important to the academy in contemporary times for three
major reasons:
(1) The academic institution, public or private, has become
less autonomous; buildings, research, and student tuition are
supported by funds over which the college or university
exercises a diminishing control.

Legislative and executive

governmental authority, at all levels, plays a part in the
making of important decisions in academic policy.

If these

voices and forces are to be successfully heard and integrated,
the academic institution must be in a position to meet them
with its own generally unified view, (2) Regard for the
welfare of the institution remains important despite the
mobility and interchange of scholars, and (3) A college or
university in which all the components are aware of the
interdependence, of the usefulness of communication among
themselves, and of the force of joint action will enjoy
increased capacity to solve educational problems (AAUP,

1984).
A Conceptive Framework for the
Traditional Mode of Academic Governances
The conceptive framework upon which the principles of the
traditional modes for academic governances have been developed include
these concepts:

(1) authority, and (2) power.

While these concepts

are often confused, they can be clearly differentiated.
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t.

The Concept of Authority
Authority is a formal concept and issues from a formal
organization (Hicks, 1967).

It is always a property of social

organization with the exercise of authority never extending beyond the
limits of the association in which it is institutionalized and which
gives it support and sanction (Flippo, 1970).

Furthermore, from the

use of a basic definition of authority, as a right to act or direct
the action of others, two explicit characteristics of authority are
stated:

(1) authority is a right and (2) as a result of possessing

the right, one is entitled and obligated to directly or indirectly
act.

Also implied but not explicitly stated in the definition is a

third characteristic of authority, which involves the power to employ
penalties or sanctions so that desired action is completed (Bierstedt,
1964) •
The Concept of Power

Power is a broad concept that is not necessarily confined to an
organizational contract and that is neither completely formal nor
informal in nature, though it may be influenced by subjective factors
including ethical and moral considerations (Sisk, 1979; French,
1974).
According to Max Weber:

"Power is the probability that one actor

within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his
own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947). Gerald R. Salancik and
Jeffrey Pfeffer define power as:

"The ability to get things done the

way one wants them to be done." (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).

In
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other words, power is the ability of a person to do something measured
in terms of his/her ability to (1) give reward, (2) promise rewards,
(3) threaten to withdraw current rewards, (4) withdraw current
rewards, (5) threaten punishment, and (6) punish (Hicks, 1967).
Power, an emotionally laden term, particularly in organizational
cultures that emphasize individuality and equality, is essentially a
relationship between people operating as individuals or groups.

It

does not consist of brute force, coercion, and dominance, but it can
be a highly effective instrument in an organization (Flippo, 1970).
Although Warren Bennis has stated, "While power is the organization's
last dirty secret," power is far from being a dirty business.

In its

most noted form, power is one of the few mechanisms available for
aligning an organization with its own reality.

Consequently, power

can be viewed, not as a dirty secret, but as a secret .to success
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).
To demonstrate power as a positive force in an organization
Salancik and Pfeffer advance a strategic-contingency model of power
theory.

This model views power as:

Something that accrues to organizational subunits that cope
with critical organizational problems.
who have it to:

Power is used by all

(1) enhance their own survival through

control of scarce critical resources, (2) through the
placement of allies, i.e., key positions, and (3) through the
definition of organizational problems and policies (Salancik
and Pfeffer, 1977).
Therefore, by the use of the processes to develop and utilize
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power by individuals or groups in an organization, the system becomes
more aligned or misaligned with its environment (Salancik and Pfeffer,
1977) •

The Concepts of Authority and Power in Academia
In academia, the concepts of authority and power, as implemented
within the university system, are best described by three basic
contingency models of governance, the (1) collegial, (2) bureaucratic
and political.
As shown in Table I, the three models are different in their
appearance/process related to governance in the university system in
the arena of: (1) image, (2) change, (3) conflict, (4) view of social
structure, (5) theoretical foundation, (6) decision-making, and
TABLE I
A Comparison of che Three Basic
Contingency Model. of Academic
Governance (Baldridge, 1971)

Collegial
Professional.
cOlllDunity

Bureaucratic
Hierarchical
bureaucracy

Minor concern

Minor con-

'liewed as abnormal: elLlninated in a
II true communi ty
of scholars"
Unitary; united
by che "conmunHy
of scholars/l

cern
Viewed as abnormal: to be
controlled by
bureaucrat.1c
sanctions
Unitary; ineegr a ted by the
formal bureaucracy

Badc theoretlcal foundaCions

Human relations

lIeber1.an bur-

approach to organizations;
Literature on
professionalism

eaucratic. mod-

VieW' of decision making

Shared, collegial decisions

Baaic linage
Change processes
Conflicc

'liew of 50c.i.l structure

el; Classical
formal systems
model

Rationalis t ic

formal bureaucratic procedures

Goal .eeting
and Policy:
formulation
or execution

Unclear: prob.b ly more emph48is on formulaUon

Emphasis on
execution

Political
Po li tical sy.tem
Primary concern
II iewed as normal: key to
analY9i. of
po licy infl uenc:e
Pluralistic;
frac cured by
subcultures
and divergenc
incereat
groups
Conf lie t theorYi Interest
group theory;
Open systems
theory Communi ty power theory
NegoUation,
bargaining and
political influence processes
Emphasis on
formulation
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(7) goal setting and policy formulation/execution.
A Supplemental Academic Governance
Mode For the University System
For the past two decades, collective bargaining has become a
supplemental mode for academic governance in higher education.

A

complicated force, grounded in a labor movement that dates from the
industrial revolution and the twentieth-century organization of
workers,

~he

process of academic collective bargaining has, according

to E. D. Duryea and Robert S. Fisk (1973):
Posed a significant change in the academic milieu.

By 1970,

professionals in an expanded number of institutions had
accepted bargaining agents, usually affiliated or associated
with a national organization, to represent their interests.
In effect, these individuals turned away from a primary
dependency on shared governance to a more pragmatic reliance
upon the power of organizations outside the disciplinary and
professional societies (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).
The process was declared by Irwin H. Polishook (1982) as:

"The

practice of the decade in higher education, which has grown in greater
proportions than the proportion of other Americans who have joined
unions" (Polishook, 1982).
A Definition of Collective Bargaining
The process of collective bargaining, using the basic industrial
definition, as written by Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg,
(1979), may be defined as:
A joint determination of the terms and conditions of the
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employment relationship by duly chosen employer and employee
representatives.

The process involves offers and counter-

offers, with the ultimate objective of reaching a written
contract (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).
Furthermore, the process of academic collective bargaining, which
initially was introduced into the university system in 1966 at the
United States Merchant Marine Academy, (Garbarino, 1975) has been
defined by the following scholars:
(a) William F. McHugh (1971)--Collective bargaining is a
process, adversary in nature, which is designed to resolve
conflict arising in an employment relationship.
consists of two fundamental elements:

The process

the act of negotiation

and the more informal relationship created during the
implementation of the contract after it is negotiated and
accepted by the parties, i.e., faculty relations under the
contract.

This bilateral relationship between faculty and

administration characteristically involves problem-oriented
consultation between the parties and administration of the
contract's grievance system for the purpose of reaching mutual
accord.

When mutual accord is not achieved, resort may be had

to more formal procedures for conflict resolution, such as
mediation, fact-finding and arbitration.

Thus, collective

bargaining, as the term is used here, means not only the
actual collective negotiation sessions but also the
complicated and subtle university-professional relationships
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that develop as the parties live under the contract (McHugh,
1971) •
(b) Donald H. Wo11ett (1971)--Co11ective negotiation in the
context of higher education, like its counterpart in the
private sector, is essentially a process of proposal and
counter-proposal, of action and reaction, of give and
take--resu1ting finally in "deal" or "no deal," in agreement
or stalemate.

The process assumes parity of legal standing

between the parties and some bargaining power on both sides.
Bilateral determination of the terms and conditions of
employment through the process of collective negotiations
means that neither party should have the ability to impose its
will on the other and that each is able to veto the proposals
of the other (Wo1lett, 1971).
(c) C. Donald Sands (1971)--Collective bargaining can
reasonably be viewed as one among alternative procedures for
achieving faculty participation in decisions affecting policy
at academic institutions.

The bargaining process is

consistent with historic traditions of relative autonomy for
institutions as well as individuals concerning matters of
intellect and pays deference to the pragmatic consideration
that absent such freedom and independence the academic
enterprise cannot effectively serve its historic mission
(Sands, 1971).
Cd) C. L. Haslam (1974)--Col1ective bargaining is a process,
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one which lends itself to a variety of expressions.

It may

indeed lead to an adversary relationship, but it may also
result in a kind of enforceable shared authority by virtue of
a statutory duty to bargain in good faith.

The broad

parameters that influence the ultimate impact that collective
bargaining has upon institutional relations depend upon the
nature of the institution itself, the quality of the issues of
local concern, and, above all, the character of the collective
bargaining agent (Haslam, 1974).
The Purpose of Collective Bargaining in Academia
The purpose of implementing the process of collective bargaining
into the university system as an alternative mode for academic
governance, according to Donald H. Wollett, (1971) is twofold:
First, faculty must have the right without legal or other
restraints to form and join organizations of their own
choosing, to designate their organization and their
representatives for the purposes of dealing with their
employing institutions, and to participate in related
organizational activity.

Second, both the faculty

organization and the governing board must have the capacity to
engage in a process of give and take negotiations (Wollett,
1971).
A Model for Academic Collective Bargaining
The general labor relations model, as seen in Figure 1, has been
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adapted to the university system in order to manage activities related
to academic collective bargaining.
The model has three major elements: (1) the structure of
selecting the bargaining representatives, (2) the structure of
negotiating the contract, and (3) the structure of administering the
contract to emphasize decision-making by consensus, rather than to
have unilateral decisions imposed upon a faculty by administration
(Wollett, 1971).

Furthermore, these elements, according to Marvin J.

Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg (1979), "have a basic logic and a
sequence that is controlled, in part, by established procedure and
modified by the behavior of all the participants" (Wollett, 1971).
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Negotiating
. the Contract r,

'---.-~;';";;':"'"

Unfair
Labor
Practlcea
Procedures
Arbltratl .. n

I Arbitration I

Figure 1.

Unfair
Labor
Practices
Procedure

(Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general labor

relations model.
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Patterns of Relationships in Academic
Collective Bargaining
The use of the general labor relations model to implement the
process of collective bargaining into the university system is best
achieved through the application of the general pattern of
labor-management relationships as illustrated in Figure 2.

To .. orll; looether lor
common ourDOS_ aecaua.

To .. ork toq_tna,

at leo.' ,eQulremenu

Qui of 'Inc.r.

'or common ourDOS8

<I.,.,.

I

I

I

I

To f1qftt

Figure 2.

!

Struc1ute" to 1IIor ..
tooaCher lor common
;:Jureo ••

(Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general pattern of

labor-management relationships.
Of the identified patterns of possible ways to manage
relationships in the academic milieu, two patterns, cooperation and
collaboration, are best-suited to prevent or manage conflict in
academic governances.

First, cooperation is the pattern characterized

as working together under law to achieve a common purpose (i.e., the
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labor contract).

Second, collaboration is that pattern in which the

faculty members and administration consider institutional conflict
dysfunctional; therefore, they make a commitment to work together, in
order to prevent confrontation in bargaining, to achieve an effective
organization system in the university system (Levine and Hagburg,
1979) •
The Legal Framework For the Establishment
of Academic Collective Bargaining
The Federal Sector
Until 1962, federal employees were permitted but a limited right
to engage in collective bargaining activities, in part because of the
sovereignty doctrine (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

That doctrine held:

The employment relationship in government, like that in the
private sector, appears more authoritarian at first than it
really is.

Government's apparently unlimited authority over

its employees was originally based on its sovereignty.

The

idea that government employees have only the rights that the
government permits them is related to the concepts that the
king can do no wrong and that government can be sued only with
its consent.

The sovereignty doctrine has often been

used • • • • to uphold a denial of the right of employee
organizations to negotiate the terms of employment (Stanley,
1972).
Furthermore, prior to the enactment of executive order 10988
there was no government-wide system of rights and representatives for
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collective bargaining between federal unions and the employer
(Stanley, 1972).

As Chairman John W. Macy Jr. of the Civil Service

Commission stated in 1962:
The weakest single element in the personnel programs of the
'40s and the '50s, in

my

opinion, was the lack of a realistic

and reasonably uniform system of employee-management relations
(Macy, 1962).
By 1961, the federal labor organizations were representing an
estimated 760,000 workers on a broad internal scope.

These

organizations were restricted to the internal utilization of
congressional lobbying to improve wages and the working conditions for
the federal employees (Macy, 1962).

However, these legislative

efforts were, according to Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg,
"rejected by the executive branch as unnecessary and unduly
restraintive of the administrative flexibility required by agency
heads" (Macy, 1962).
During the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy, the
efforts of those involved in the federal sector labor-management
relations began to identify a possible change in executive attitude
toward the development of collective bargaining on a system of
industrial governments when Kennedy stated that: "He had always
believed in the right of federal employees to deal collectively with
the federal departments and agencies in which they are employed should
be protected" (Goldberg, 1962).
Upon his election, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force
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chaired by the Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg to develop
policies related to federal service labor-management relations.

By

late 1961, the Task Force reported to President Kennedy that a special
program needed to be developed to meet the federal sector needs.
Task Force development:

The

(1) recognized the right of federal employees

and employee organizations to participate in developing improved
personnel policies and working conditions; (2) recommended that
employee organizations be consulted and that under specified
conditions management be authorized to enter into agreements with
unions; (3) called for regularizing arbitration procedures in handling
individual employee grievances; (4) requested legislation to authorize
voluntary withholding of dues; and (5) recommended the nomination by
the Secretary of Labor, when necessary, of panels of expert
arbitrators to make advisory recommendations as to what constitutes
appropriate units for negotiating purposes and to supervise
representation elections (Goldberg, 1962).

On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy issued and signed
Executive Order 10988 entitled "Employee-Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service" - which established the basic pattern of labor and
management relations in the federal sector (Levine and Hagburg,
1979).

It introduced three levels of union recognition - informal,

formal and exclusive.

In addition, the law established the concepts

of exclusive bargaining units and regulated agreements in government
(Levine and Hagburg, 1979).
As shown in Table II, Executive Order 10988 was superseded by
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A Sumaary of the Hajor txecutlve Order. Related to LaborHana8ement Rel.tlon.hlp tn Federal Union. and Asency
Han.8ement (Levine and Hagbura. 1979)

Execu t i VC! Ord er

E.O. 10988

January 17, 1962

Prelldent

Key Concept. of the txeeutlve Order

John F. Kennedy

E.t.bll.hed • ballc p.ttern for 1.bor-m.n.gemane relation. for federal union and .seney
lllan.g .... ent; (2) It provided three level. of
union recognltlon--lnform.l formal Ind
exclu.lve; (J) the right of federal lector
and e=ployer to Join/form 0 unLon of their
cholcQ

vlthou~ man.aem.n~

interference v ••

off lmad; (4) the negot I. CLon of 0 l.bor shop
&gream.nt w•• prohlblted (5) the relolution
of Imp ..... w.. left to partiel; (6) odvlsory
arbitration became 0 method for relolvlng
grlevanceI; and (7) the Dep.rtment of Labor
va. "Iigned to ••• 1st In the relolutton of
repr •• entat1ve dilput •••

E. O. 11491

Oc tober 29,

£.0. 11616

c..0. 11838

1969

Rlch.rd H. Nixon

!he eetabl,.hment of three new &gencie. to
centralize decision IllakLng formerly exerelsed
by the IndiVidual os.ncl .. : • Federal Labor
Rel.tlone Council to ad.,lnister the order, a
Federal Service u-p ••••• Panel to ••• lst the
partie. to re.olve negoti.tlng imp ••• e., and
an ••• 1atant •• cretary of l~bor for t.bOfman&sement relations to determine a number of
iSlue. formerly decided by the agency he.d;
(2) the Federal Hadl.tlon and Conciliation
Service va. granted & role to mediate negoti.tlon dllput.a; (3) p.ld time could be nesotl.tad for union repre.entative. eng.ged in
contract ne80tiation. up to either a m&Xlmum
of forty hours or 50 percent of the total
hour • • pent In b.rgaining; (4) binding .rbltration .. the lnt .tep in the gr lev.nce
procedure could be n.sotl.ted; (5) the aamlni.tratlve charge for dua. checkoff could be
ne8otiated; and (6) the reqUirement of
reportin8 and dlacloaura procedurea .lmilar
to tho .. demanded of uniona in private
IIIployment wn lmpoe.d.

Aug\1at 26, 1971

Richard H. Nixon

!he adminl.tratlv. ch.nge permitting due.
becom •• a negotiable It~; (2) the negotiated
crievance procedure v •• now the only one
av.ilable for h.ndlins dispute. over the
tnUrpr.tation and .pplic.tion of the contr.ct.; and (3) union. can negoti.te p.id
time for un10n r.pr ••• nt~t1v •• ens.sed in
contrect n.sotiation. up to either. max1m\ml
of forty hour. or 50 percent of the total
tim• • pent ne80tiatins.

February 6, 1975

Gerald I.. Ford

Facllitat.ed the con.oildat10n of SlIIaller. 1nefficient b.r8ainins unit. 1nto f~er larger
ane.; (2) broadened the .cope of negoti.tion
by limitin8 the power ot n.tional agency ugulation. to prohibit b.rgainin8 in condit10nl
of IIIIploym.nt; and (3) made the .cope of
gri.vance procedur •• in contract. & mAndatory
b.rsaini", topic.
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Order No. 11491 signed into law in 1969 by President Richard M. Nixon
(Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

This order introduced several significant

changes, including the right of federal employees to negotiate binding
arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure (Levine and
Hagburg, 1979).
In 1975, President Gerald A. Ford amended Executive Order 11491
with the issuance of E.O. 11838, which required the settlement of
disputes arising out of unfair labor practices (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).
The Public Sector
State Public Labor Laws
In the United States, the legal endorsement guaranteeing public
sector employees the rights to union representation in bargaining was
slow to develop.

As Joseph W. Garbarino wrote in 1973:

Traditionally, in representing the interests of their
members, associations of public employees engaged primarily in
lobbying and political activity.

They usually limited their

membership to a single employing jurisdiction such as a state
or county.

At times they did include substantial numbers of

members from education, but in addition, organizations based
upon particular occupational groups were formed to speak for
the interest of particular constituencies (Garbarino, 1973).
By the late 1960s, the legal right of public employees to
organize for collective bargaining began in the large metropolitan
centers of Cincinnati and Philadelphia, with New York establishing a
formal system of bargaining by executive order in 1958.

The first
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state legislation allowing for collective bargaining by state
employees was enacted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1959.

This

development was further stimulated by President Kennedy's Executive
Order 10988, issued in 1962 (Garbarino, 1973).

As the president of

AFSCME, Jerry Wurf, said in 1966:
His [President Kennedy's] action, which gave federal
employees the right to organize and set an example that has
been followed by many states, counties, and cities, probably
was a major contributing factor in the rapid growth of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(Wurf, 1966).
The pattern of legislation on public sector collective bargaining
that has emerged from the several states is one characterized by a
noticeable lack of uniformity in legal requirements and practices.
This pattern of diversity is due, in large part, to the absence of any
federal standards governing labor relations for state and local
government employees, analogous to those set forth in the Wagner Act
of 1935 governing labor relations in private sector employment.

It

might also be argued that the absence of federal legislation on this
matter has made it possible for the states to now 'pre-empt the
regulation of labor relations for state and local government employees
under a doctrine of States Rights (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).
Following this line of reasoning, public sector labor law of the
states has tended to be a reflection of the political values and
demographic patterns within the various states.

As is shown in Table
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III, by 1978, thirty states had enacted collective bargaining laws
that covered all or some categories of public employment, while three
states had no laws pertaining to public sector collective bargaining,
other states had blanket prohibitions on collective bargaining by
public employees.
Collective Bargaining and the University System
The Entrance of Academic Bargaining
Into the University System
As society developed collective bargaining laws for both the
federal and public sector employees, academic unionism emerged as a
potent force in higher education (Garbarino, 1973).

Joseph W.

Garbarino wrote in 1973:
The exclusion to government workers, particularly at the
state levels, of the right to organize for collective
bargaining is the most significant single reason for the
present form and growth of academic unions.

Furthermore,

since education is a function basically of the states, while
the degree of encouragement among states varies greatly,
permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the
burst of academic unions in the late 1960s and early 1970s
(Garbarino, 1973).
Although the legal base for academic unionism was developed,
collective bargaining was slow to enter the 4-year institution of
higher education.

The rationale for this slower growth rate in the

university system has been identified by labor relations scholars as

Table II I
A Summary of the Characterlstlca of the HaJor
Lawa Enacled In the Public Sector by
1978 (Levine & Hagburg. 1979)

Kind of Bargaining Law

Scope of Lew

State. Covered by Law

(1) Comprehenalve Law

Broad-scope collective bargaining
on wages. hours and employment
conditions for the state snd local
government employees.

Connecticut
lIawaU
Iowa
Halne
Haooachuaetta
Hlnneoota
Hontana
Nebraska

New Hampahlre
New Jereey .
New York
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode leland
South Dakota
Wlaconsln

Full-scope bargaining law for local
government employees only.

MIchigan
Nevada
Oklahoma

Vermont
WashIngton

Full-acope bargalnlng laws for
state employeea.

Alaaka

Limited form of collective
bargaining for .t.te employees.
These lawa exclude wage and benefita
from bargaining.

Delaware
Vermont
Waohlngton

Law for local governancea whose
governing bodies opt for coversge.

Delaware

(2)

Heet and Confer Lava

A weak law that covera state and
local employees; It Is limited to
"meet and confer" requirements
rather thsn bargaining.

California
florida
Kanaas
Hlasourl

(3)

No Law

No applicable negotiation procedures
available for either state or local
employees.

Arizona
Colorado
Ohio

W

N
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threefold:
(1) The elite institutions of higher education have
continued to support the concept of the traditional shared
governance mode to implement the employment relationships
between the faculty and university, (2) in such quality
institutions as the Ivy League schools, the prestigious public
and private research institutions, and select liberal arts
colleges, the professor is perceived as a master, not
employee; therefore, an academician does not need a surrogate
to plead the "master case" with the university system, and (3)
the academy has lived with myths about academic unionism
(Hagengruber, 1978; Polishook, 1982).
This rationale is further supported by the 1972 study
IIProfessors, Union and Higher Education ll conducted by Everett Ladd and
Seymour Lipset.

The data reported in their study concluded that:

Forty-three percent of the faculty sampled agreed that the
growth of unionization of college and university faculty is
beneficial and should be extended, while 44 percent disagreed,
and 13 percent entertained conflicting assessments (Ladd and
Lipset, 1973).
The study supported, as shown in (Appendix B), the 1969 Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education survey findings that faculty members'
selection of bargaining in the university system is based upon two
independent sources:

(1) class interest, and (2) ideology.

and Lipset (1973) stated:

As Ladd
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Professors of low scholarly achievement give greater backing
to the principle of collective bargaining than do their most
productive colleagues; untenured professors more than those
with tenure; and academicians with low salaries are more
supportive than their

bett~r

rewarded associates (Ladd and

Lipset, 1972).
Furthermore, the general political views of the academicians are
significant factors in the selection of collective bargaining as a
supplemental governance mode for the university system.
Lipset reported:

As Ladd and

"Eighty percent of the professors scoring on the

liberal-quintile of the Liberalism-Conservative score, concurred that
faculty strikes are legitimate means of collective action" (Ladd and
Lipset, 1973).
The Scope of Academic Collective Bargaining
The United States Merchant Marine Academy is reported as the
first 4-year institution of higher education to accept collective
bargaining.

A private school, the Academy was organized in 1966 by

the American Federation of Teachers.

However, academic unions did not

attract public attention until 1969, when the collective bargaining
process was introduced into the public university system in the City
University of New York. This opportunity was provided for the faculty
members of CUNY, as professionals, by the 1967 passage of the Taylor
Law in New York State (Garbarino, 1973).
according to Donald H. Wollett:

It was a law which,

"Provided for collective negotiation

by state, county and municipal employees, including employees of any
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governmental units operating a public school, college or university"
(Wollett, 1971).
Since the initial battle cry, "Professors Unite," in 1969 by
Myron Lieberman, a faculty member of CUNY, academic unionism has shown
a dramatic growth in the 4-year institutions of higher education
(Garbarino, 1973).

As shown in Table IV, from the data prepared by

The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher
Education and the Professions of Baruch College, City University of
New York, the major growth years for academic unionism in the 4-year
institutions were the mid to late 1970s, as well as 1981.
TABLE IV (Douglas, 1984)
GROWTH OF UNIONIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, 1974-1983

Academic Collective Bargaining Agents and Agreements
In 1984, as shown in Table V, there was a total of 134 recognized
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bargaining agents in the 4-year institutions of higher education.

Of

this number, 71 are listed in public institutions, while 63 were
reported in private institutions.

At the same time, as Table VI

demonstrates, 64 agreements were reported in the public institutions
and 54 agreements were reported for the private schools.
TABLE V (Douglas, 1984)
RECOGNIZED BARGAINING AGENTS
January, 1984
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The growth of academic unionism has been attributed to three
major national organizations that have actively competed for faculty
support in collective bargaining elections (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).
These external organizations, the American Federation of Teachers, the
National Teachers Association and the American Association of
University Professors were identified by William T. McHugh (1971) as:
having a more practical appeal because they are better
equipped to organize and promote collective bargaining than
are local senates or traditional governance organizations
because:

(1) senates are often comprised of students or

employees who do not share a community of interests with
faculty in a collective bargaining sensej (2) they have money,
trained staff lawyers, and other resources necessary to
organize, campaign, and utilize the legal machinery of labor
acts; and (3) they are willing to represent the particular
cause of an individual faculty member (McHugh, 1971).
While these national organizations share a common goal in the
university system, the interpretation and implementation of collective
bargaining statutes, as Table VII shows, each organization, as an
academic union, has a unique profile.
In January 1984, as shown in Table VIII, these three national
external organizations continue to represent the majority of faculty
members in the 137 4-year unionized institutions.

While the AAUP

represents 40 institutions of the 134 schools in higher education, the
AFT is agent for 31 of the schools and the NEA represents 33 groups.

TABLE VII
The Major National Organizations As Representatives
of 4-Year Inlltitutions in Collect:1ve Bargaining
Negotiations (Garbarino, 1973; Douglas, 1984)

Organization

Entry Year Into
Higher Education
Bargaining

Orgsnlzation Profile

TIle American Federation
of Teachers
(AFT)

1967

This organization is recognized as the pioneer of faculty
unionism. Its most distinctive feature is the longstanding link with organized labor; it hss chsmpioned the
trade union model in education. The AFT has been
strongest in public 4-year colleges in the industrial
states.

The Nstionsl Education
Association
(NEA)

1968

In this orgsnization. the independent members are enrolled
into three levels of membership--nstional. stste and
local--with the key structure of the organization at the
state level. The NEA strength in the 4-year college
has been almost entirely in former teacher colleges.
psrtlcularly in the state of Pennsylvania.

The American Association
of University Professors
(AAUP)

1966

The association developed in 1972 a "Statement on Collective Bargaining" to justify the association involvement in
the collective bargaining process. These justifications
are based upon the association's commitment to the fact
that:
a. The shaping of collective bargaining should not be
left to organizattons lacking dedication to principles
developed by the Association and widely accepted by the
academic community.
b. The Association is influential in the shaping of
collective bargaining, the principles of academic freedom
and tenure and the primary responsibility of a faculty for
determining academic policy will be secured.
c. The implementation of Association-supported principles, based upon the profession's traditions and moral
suasion can be effectively supplemented by a collective
bargaining agreement and given the force of law.

w
<Xl
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While in the public institution, the AAUP is the most common elected
bargaining agent, in the private institutions, the AFT is the agent of
choice.
Table VIII (Douglas, 1984)
Analysis of Bargaining Agents and Collective
Bargaining Agreements
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The Subject of Contract Negotiations
in Academic Bargaining
The formal collective bargaining procedure as accepted in the
university system of higher education is a process intended to
contractually attain participation in academic governance.

As William

F. McHugh (1971) wrote,
Academic Collective Bargaining is a formal procedure which
insures appropriate consultation and opportunity for the
professional staff to present ideas and attitudes to the
governing boards or other sources of authority are appearing
in contracts (McHugh, 1971).
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However, the negotiation of a contractura1 agreement in the
academy requires that established labor laws be adjusted to the unique
university governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974).

Furthermore, in

academic collective bargaining, where the application of these
principles presents unique problems, (Glidden, 1977) the contract
according to Herbert D. Schwartzman, must:
Determine not only the relative rights, duties and obligations
of the contracting parties, but also the effect of the
collective bargaining relationship upon the governance
structure of the university.

Conversely, where such matters

as appointment, promotion, tenure, discharge, etc., are
subject to peer judgment, the collective bargaining agreement
should not provide a means of obviating, by arbitration or
otherWise, an adverse decision by the peers or the reviewing
bodies in the governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974).
For the faculty member with an appointment in the academy, the
"terms and conditions" of employment have been defined to include the
traditional issue of collective bargaining, as well as a wider
spectrum of subjects than are usually found in public employee
contracts (McHugh, 1971).

The scope of these subjects is rooted in

the concept of shared authority a concept, according to William F.
McHugh (1971), that:
Faculty should share in the governance of the institution.
Thus, the concept of negotiable issues covers everything from
admission, class size, academic calendar, procedures for
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budget formulation, participation in physical plant planning
and expansion, allocation of resources, to athletic policy and
procedures for selection of administrators and department
chairmen.

This concept of "shared authority," peculiar to

educational institutions, includes a wider spectrum of matters
than customarily associated with industry or public employment
bargaining (McHugh, 1971).
The right of the academician to a wider spectrum of bargaining
subjects in the university system was fully supported by the American
Association of University Professors' "Statement on Government of
Colleges and Universities" as formulated in 1966 in collaboration with
the American Council on Education and the Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges. This "Statement" called for a
mutual understanding regarding the governance of an institution,
stressing the principles of shared governance as significant to the
academy in contemporary times (AAUP, 1984).

This position justified

faculty responsibilities to participate in academic governance
because:
Faculty judgment is central to general educational policy.
Furthermore, scholars in a particular field or activity have
the chief competence for judging the work of their

col~eagues,

in such competence it is Unplicit that responsibility exists
for both adverse and favorable judgment.

Likewise there is

the more general component of experience, faculty personnel
committees having a broader charge (Sands, 1971).
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Furthermore, the American Association of University Professors'
1969 "Statement of Policy on Representation of Economic and
Professional Interests," detailed that:
Through the negotiation of a collective agreement it may in
some institutions be possible to create a proper environment
for faculty and administration to carry out their respective
functions and to provide for the eventual establishment of
necessary instruments of shared authority and responsibility
in purely educational, curricular and legislative matters
(Sands, 1971).
In 1971, Do~ald H. Wollett further characterized issues related
to academic contract negotiation into four major categories of faculty
concerns, during an address to the National Conference of Collective
Negotiation in New York.

As shown in Table IX, the five major

categories of issues presented were: (1) procedures for faculty
representation; (2) educational policies; (3) working conditions and
the administration of personnel policies; (4) aggregate economic
issues; and (5) public issues and the institution.

TABLE IX
The Specific Issues Relative to the Five
Major Categories of Academic Contract
Negotiations (Wollett, 1971)

Five Major Categories

1.

Procedure for Faculty
Representation

Specific

"Is5ue~

of the Category

The right to participate in the formulation of the organic law
that defines the nature of their representation with the
Institution.

2.

Educational Policy

These Issues include: academic standards, curriculum, degree
requirements, grading standards, standards of academic freedom,
standards for "student conduct and discipline, procedures for the
appointment of administrative personnel.

3.

Working Condltlonsl
Personnel Policies

Ttlese issues

include:

appointment, promotion,

tenure.

course

assignments, work schedules, work load, salaries and fringe
benefits, office space, secretaries, service and grievance
proced~res.

4.

Aggregate Economic
Issues

These Issues Inc lude: the allocat Ion of resources to major
budgetary categories, salaries and fringe benefits and the
allocation of funds to support the major educational objectives
of the Institution.

5.

Public Issues and the
Institute

The right to participate In the formation of Institutional
policies related to public questions that have a direct and
Important effect on the operation of the institution.

.p.
W
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Collective Bargaining in the Oregon System of
Higher Education: Focus on the 4-Year Institutions
In 1973, Oregon enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws
for the educator as a public employee.

These laws permitted faculty

members with an appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher
education to select collective bargaining as a supplemental governance
mode for their participation in institutional governances (Garbarino,
1973) •
Since 1973, three of Oregon's eight 4-year institutions of higher
education have entered into collective bargaiing.

The initial

contract was implemented in 1975 at Southern Oregon State College.

In

1979, additional academic collective bargaining contracts were
implemented for faculty members at Western Oregon State College and
Portland State University (Douglas, 1984).
Faculty members at Southern Oregon State College are represented
by an independent agent, while the American Federation of Teachers was
chosen to represent Western Oregon State College and the American
Association of University Professors was elected as the bargaining
agent for Portland State University.
In addition, five "no-agent" faculty elections have been reported
between 1975 and 1983 at other 4-year institutions of higher education
in Oregon.

Coalitions were defeated in 1975 at Oregon Institute of

Technology and during 1977 at the University of Oregon, Eastern Oregon
State College and Oregon State University.

A second loss for a

collective bargaining election was reported in 1983 at Oregon State
College (Douglas, 1984).
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The Effects of Academic Collective Bargaining
in the University System
Since 1966, acceptance of academic collective bargaining as a
supplemental governance mode has grown in the university system of
higher education.
wrote in 1982:

As Jack L. Nelson, a Rutger's University professor,

"The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in

the number of states, institutions, and individual faculty members
operating under collective bargaining agreements" (Nelson, 1982).
Therefore, the myths that initially challenged the acceptance of
collective bargaining by the academy have, according to Irwin H.
Polishook:
Given way to mature relationships based upon the acceptance of
collective bargaining by the administration and a mutual
commitment to use the process to protect the integrity of the
university (Polishook, 1982) •
. The research of Begin, (1974) Kemerer and Baldridge, (1976)
Mortimer, et al. (1976) and Lee, (1979) as well as the scholarly
contributions of Nelson (1982) and Polishook (1982) further support
the selection of collective bargaining by faculty members as a
positive supplemental governance mode for the university system.
Their studies have documented that while collective bargaining is a
form of adversarial governance, it has not fostered disharmony in the
university system.

Furthermore, academic collective bargaining has

established faculty unions and faculty governance bodies as partners
in a reciprocal process that has supported, clarified, and enhanced
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institutional governance structure, in order to guarantee or advance
faculty rights.

As Jack L. Nelson wrote in 1982:

While there were some initial problems, collective bargaining
actually clarified the decision-making process and a number of
previously ambiguous topics in academia.

Collective

bargaining is one of the few ways to bring some semblance of
balance into academic decision-making (Nelson, 1982).
In 1979, the study of Barbara A. Lee further identified the
position of academic collective bargaining as a positive force on
governance structures in the university system.

Eight major

conclusions confirmed that:
(1) Faculty as a whole gained formal governance power through
the union contract.

Even on campuses where faculty had

enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract
legitimated and in many cases broadened the scope of the
faculty's governance role.
(2) Administrators at the vice presidential level and
presidential level acquired greater authority over formal
decisions, particularly in personnel matters, many of which
had once been made by deans and "rubber-stamped" by
administrators at higher levels.

Contracts now stipulated

decision responsibility and accountability at levels above the
dean.
(3) Deans appeared to have lost much of their autonomy over
personnel and workload decisions; however, they retained much
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of their authority to allocate budgets.
(4) The single most significant effect of unionization at the
six institutions visited was the promulgation of a formal
grievance procedure.

This process resulted in promotion and

tenure policies generally considered to be fairer and more
consistent than practices prior to unionization.
(5) At institutions where senates were relatively new or had
minimal faculty support, senates were abolished and replaced
with union-dominated faculty committees.

At institutions with

traditionally strong faculty senates, unions respected senate
prerogatives and focused on economic issues.

At these latter

institutions, senate and union leadership overlapped.
(6) On campuses that had a tradition of faculty participation
in governance, union influence appeared minimal.

However, it

was evident that external threats against faculty autonomy or
a reversal of the administration's cooperative attitude would
energize and strengthen the union.
(7) Unionization tended to formalize relationships between
faculty and administration, regardless of the quality of these
relationships.

This formalization reduced the ability of an

individual to influence decision-making by informal means.
(8) Departments, as academic units, either retained their
former decision-making power or gained additional power as a
result of unionization.

Nearly all academic and most

personnel decisions were made at this level and usually
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prevailed (unless prevented by budget restrictions).

Because

the grievance process usually started with the chairperson or
the dean, departmental decisions seldom were challenged except
on due process grounds (Lee, 1979).
The forthcoming study of Kemerer and Baldridge will identify four
positive trends that have occurred in the university system as a
result of academic collective bargaining.

The trends, as reported in

1980 by J. Victor Baldridge support that:
(1) The collective bargaining process standardized procedures
in personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits
to them identified as:

(a) order to the system, and (2)

increased equity.
(2) The collective bargaining process helped the economic
status of the profession.

The bargaining process seems to

have generated additional money.
(3) The collective bargaining process resulted in the
so-called "dual track" relationship between faculty senates
and unions, whereby senates serve faculty members' academic
interests and unions serve their economic concerns, remaining
viable at campuses that have both unions and senates.
(4) The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to
the "decentralization" of administrative powers and authority
(Baldridge, 1982).
Twenty years of empirical study by the academy has disproved the
initial myths and concerns about the adoption of collective bargaining
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in the university system; therefore, in 1983, according to Irwin H.
Polishook:
The real "adversary" within the academic cOIlUllunity is the
individual who continues to perpetuate a mythology of faculty
unions without coming to grips with the practice of a decade
(Polishook, 1982).

Chapter III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
Introduction
This chapter presents the research methodology and procedures
selected for the conduct of this evaluative research survey.

The

presentation will include a review of the (1) research model,
(2) research methodology, and (3) procedures specific to the study,
which includes a discussion of the (a) research instrument,
(b) population, (c) data collection, and (d) the data analysis
selected for the study.
The Research Model: Synthesis of Theory and Fact
Introduction
The research model for this study was developed from the
comprehensive literature review as presented in Chapter II.

Scholarly

contributions and research studies, which cite academic collective
bargaining as a supplemental governance mode adapted in the university
system to support faculty members' participation in institutional
governance, were used to design the theoretical framework for this
research study.
(A)

Specifically, the literature supports:

A relationship between the faculty members' demographic
profile (professional status and academic appointment) and
their endorsements of academic collective bargaining (Ladd
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and Lipset, 1973; Garbarino and Aussieker, 1975; Wollett,
1971).
(B)

A relationship between the influence of contextual factors
on a university system's structures/function and the
decision of a faculty to select academic collective
bargaining as a supplemental mode in lieu of the traditional
forms of institutional governance (Begin, 1978; Kemerer and
Baldridge, 1975; Morttmer and Richardson, 1977; Lee, 1979).

(C)

The relationship of academic collective bargaining as a
supplemental governance mode for the university system and
the support that the process should provide for faculty
members to participate in decision-making issues related to
institutional governance (Baldridge, 1982; Hedgepeth, 1974;
Lee, 1979; Nelson, 1982; Polishook, 1982).

The design for the research model, as shown in Figure 3, was
based upon three fundamental assumptions regarding the adoption of
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental institutional
governance mode in a university system. These assumptions include
(1) demographic factors, (2) contextual factors, and (3) those issues
related to a faculty member's professional rights to participate in
institutional governance.
Demographic Factors
This section of the study was developed to assess the demographic
factors (professional status and academic appointments) of those

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE SET

IColiective Bargaining I
Demographic Factors

Con t ext u a I Factors

1. Professional Status
2. Professional Academic
Appointment

~

1. External Forces
2. Internal Forces

~

DEPENDENT VARIABLE SET
~

1

I.
tI
Institutional Governance

/
Professional
Interest
1. Research
2. Scholarship
3. Peer Judgment

Figure 3.

/

Economic Interests
Resources alrocated
for the:
1. Total Institution
2. Academician Security
~udgetary Categories

\
Educational
Policies
1."Teaching
2. Programs
3. Students

Academic and
Personnel Policie
1. Academic Duties
2. Academic Standards
3. Employment Conditions

A schematic diagram of the theoretical research model
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academicians who have endorsed academic unionism for one of Oregon's
4-year institutions of higher education.
In the university system, there are two major sets of demographic
factors: (1) class interest, and (2) political orientation, which can
be used to profile those academicians who tend to support academic
collective bargaining.
Most faculty members who select academic collective bargaining as
a supplemental governance mode hold an appointment in a 4-year
institution identified with a lower scholarly prestige, fewer
financial resources and economic benefits.

Furthermore, these

academicians usually hold a lower academic rank, lack tenure, are
younger and perceive themselves as liberal in political
issues/attitudes (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).
For this study, the following demographic ·factors were included
in the research design:
1.

The academic department/school.

2.

Academic rank.

3.

The number of years of teaching in a 4-year institution.

4.

AAUP membership.

5.

Salary.

6.

Appointment to a university/department academic governing
committee.

7.

Age range.

8.

The amount of involvement with the collective bargaining
process.
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Contextual Factors
For this section of the study, the research model was designed to
identify the contextual factors, either external or internal to the
university system of employment, which influenced faculty members to
select academic bargaining as a supplemental governance mode.
Contextual factors are forces, either external or internal to a
university system, which have the potential to influence both
structural and functional changes within a system.

Consequently,

these changes can directly impact the governance structures of the
institution, which includes: (1) the locus of decision-making, (2) the
amount of bureaucratic regulations, and (3) the degree of faculty
autonomy within an institution (Lee, 1979).
Two specific sets of issues related to: (1) external factors and
(2) internal forces, which have the potential to impact the structure
and function of a university system, were developed in the research
model for this segment of the study.
Institutional Governance
Academic institutional governance is a process that refers to the
formal structure and activities used in a university system to make
those decisions that affect relationships, procedures, and policies
(Duryea and Fisk, 1973).
As shown in Figure 4, the concept of academic institutional
governance is used to form the dependent variable set of the research
model.

For this study, the dependent variable set is divided into

four specific subsets related to governance issues:

(1) professional
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interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and
(4) academic and personnel policies.

DEPENDENT

------

~

~\
Professional
Interest
1. Research
2. Scholarship
3. Peer Judgment

\J ARIABLE SET

Institutional Governance

I

Economic Interests
Re sources alloca ted
for the:
1. Total Institution
2. Academician Security
3. Budgetary Categories

\
Educational
PolicIes
1. Teaching
2. Programs
3. Studenls

Academic and
Personnel Policies
1. Academic Duties
2. Academic Standards
3. Employment Con9~!ions

--

Figure 4.

The dependent variable set of the research

model
Professional Interests
This dependent variable subset of the research model was designed
to evaluate the impact of the academic collective bargaining process
as adopted in three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education, on the professional status of university teaching.
Since the 1960s, shared authority has become an accepted form for
academic governance for faculty members and administrators in the
university system.

Shared governance stamped with professional status

the services of the professoriate, thereby making their role more than
that of employees and strengthened the ancient idea of the university
as primarily an association of scholars.

Furthermore, the concept of

shared authority became the guiding principle for the development of
the academic profession, with research and scholarly contribution as
the major criteria for evaluating the academician's achievement
(Duryea and Fisk, 1973).
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In 1966, the academy introduced collective bargaining as a
supplemental governance mode for the university system.

This process

has accentuated the organizational role of the academician as an
employee in contrast to the ideal of a professional who is a
participant in the academic enterprise (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).
Specific professional interests of the academician included in
this dependent variable subset are (1) research, (2) scholarship, and
(3) peer judgment.
Economic Interests
This subsection of the dependent variable set was designed t()
investigate faculty members' participation in the decision-making
process of those academic governance issues related to economic
interests.
Before 1972, the watershed years of academic growth provided the
academy, as well as the academicians, with "economy gains" in
salaries, student enrollment, and research funding.

However, this

past decade has shown a steady decline in academic compensation and
student enrollment, as well as less federal and state funding
available to the university system. Consequently, the American
professoriate, while wanting to retain the academy's traditional
belief that the academicians' salary is not a wage, has decided to
accept academic unionism to protect its economic interests (Krueger,
1979).

It is a decision that the American Association of University

Professors recognized as significant and defined in the 1969
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IIStatement Policy on Representation of Economic and Professional
Interests ll by stating:
Collective bargaining may play a significant role in
bringing agreements between faculty and administration on
economic issues (AAUP, 1984).
The scope of faculty members· participation in the governance of
the institution·s economic issues should include involvement in
short-range as well as long-term planning regarding budgetary
decisions for the institution (Mason, 1982).

As Henry J. Mason (1982)

states:
In the budgetary process, while faculty must keep itself
available to give advice day to day, it should also seek
involvements in the planning process. Otherwise, it faces
the real danger of lost initiative, in which budgets drive
and control academic plans and programs, rather than the
reverse (Mason, 1982).
For the study, three aggregate economic issues related to faculty
members· rights to participate in the total financial process of the
institution were included: (1) the total resources available to the
institution, (2) the distribution of resources allocated to provide
for the academicians· economic security, and (3) the allocation of
resources to major budgetary categories.
Educational Policies
This particular dependent variable subset was developed to
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measure faculty members' participation in those academic issues of
institutional governance related to educational policies.
In the academic community, tradition has established the right of
faculty members to be active participants in determining educational
policies for a university (Sands, 1971).

Furthermore, faculty members

have the primary responsibility to establish those policies and
procedures that govern the educational process because their judgment
as educators is central to general educational policy (AAUP, 1984).
In addition, faculty members have the right and responsibility
for the establishment of those policies and procedures specific to:
admission standards, curriculum, teaching method, degree requirements,
grading standards, types of degrees offered, the establishment of
programs, as well as those issues related to student life, which
includes conduct and discipline.
For the study, three areas of educational policies were included
in the research model.

These areas studied those policies in a

university system related to (1) teaching, (2) programs, and
(3) students.
Academic and Personnel Policies
This subsection of the dependent variable set was selected for
inclusion in the study to evaluate the faculty members' participation
in governance issues related to personnel policies and the working
conditions of their institution.
University educators have the primary governance authority for

59
all matters related to faculty status (Sands, 1971).

As the 1969

"Statement on Governance of Colleges and Universities" of the American
Association of University Professors states:
Scholars in a particular field or activity have the chief
competence for judging the work of their colleagues; in such
competence it is implicit that responsibility exists for
both adverse and favorable judgments (AAUP, 1984).
Among the factors that relate to the faculty status of the
university educator in the area of personnel policies are:
appointments, promotion, tenure, salary, and teaching schedule.

In

addition, the academician has a right to participate in decisions
related to the working conditions of his employment, which includes
the issues of office space or secretarial or support office services
(Wollett, 1971).
Three major areas related to the personnel policies and the
working conditions of unionized faculty members were used in this
section of the study: (1) academic duties, (2) academic standards, and
(3) employment conditions.
The Research Methodology
An Evaluative Survey
The purpose of this evaluative research survey was to study
select faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year
unionized institutions of higher education to determine whether or not
collective bargaining has supported faculty members' rights for
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participation in institutional governance.

To achieve the stated

purpose, the following problems were investigated:
1.

Have the professional interests of the academician with an
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education been affirmed through the collective bargaining
process?

2.

Has collective bargaining provided for the academician's
participation in financial planning and policy-making related
to the economic interests as an employee in Oregon's 4-year
institutions of higher education?

3.

Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining the educational policies for the institution
that are related to academic issues?

4.

Has the collective bargaining process provided support for
the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education rights to participate in determining the academic
and personnel policies of their employment?

The research methodology for this study was reviewed for
compliance with the DREW policies and regulations for the protection
of human subjects by the Human Subjects Research Review Committee of
Portland State University.

The methodology was approved by the

committee, as providing adequate provisions to protect the rights and
welfare of the human subjects (See Appendix C).
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Procedures for the Study
The Research Instrument
The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective
Bargaining As A Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in
Institutional Governance" was designed for this evaluative survey to
include three parts: (1) Respondent Information, (2) Institutional
Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.
a.

Part I - Respondent Information of the questionnaire was
designed to collect demographic information about the faculty
members with an appointment in Oregon's three 4-year
unionized institutions of higher education.

The information,

which includes personal and professional characteristics, was
used to identify a professional profile of the faculty
members as an aggregate group and as employees of the three
unionized institutions.
The six specific demographic factors included in this
research design are:

(1) the number of years of teaching in

a 4-year institution, (2) AAUP membership, (3) salary,
(4) appointment to a university/department, (5) age range,
and (6) institutional involvement with the collective
bargaining process.

6.)

(See Questionnaire items: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
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b.

Part II - Institutional Information of the research
instrument was a section designed to identify those
contextual factors, both external and internal to the
university system, which influenced the faculty members with
an appointment in Oregon's three unionized 4-year
institutions of higher education to vote for a new bargaining
contract in 1983.
For the research design, those questions related to the
contextual factors were: (1) student enrollment, (2) state
and federal funding, (3) institutional growth, (4) a decline
in academic programs, (5) decentralized policy-making,
student power, and (6) the effectiveness of the university's
academic senate/council, organizational structural change.
(See Questionnaire items: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16,17,18,19.)

c.

Part III - Institutional Governance Information - items were
36 statements developed to collect data specific to the
dependent variables set of the research model, institutional
governance.

Four dependent variable subsets:

(1) professional status, (2) aggregate economic issues, (3)
educational policies, and (4) working conditions/personnel
policies were used to study select faculty members with an
appointment in ·Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education in order to evaluate academic collective bargaining
as a supplemental governance mode in higher education to:
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1.

Affirm the professional status of the academician in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education (See
Questionnaire items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.)

2.

Provide for the academic participation in the financial
planning and policy-making related to the aggregate
economic factors of Oregon's 4-year institutions of
higher education. (See Questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.)

3.

Provide for the academicians' participation in
determining the institution's educational policies
related to academic issues (See Questionnaire items: 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43).

4.

Provide for the academicians' participation in
determining the conditions of employment and personnel
policies (See Questionnaire items: 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.)

A Likert five-point scale: (5) strongly agree, (4) agree,
(3) undecided, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree was used to
measure the responses to each item of the questionnaire, except in
Part III, D. Working Conditions. For this section, a 4-point scale of:
(4) always, (3) frequently, (2) infrequently, and (1) never was used
to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode to
provide support for faculty members' right to participate in
determining those policies related to: (1) Academic Duties,
(2) Academic Standards/ Personnel Policies, and (3) Support Services.
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The research instrument was designed and developed between
January 1983 and May 1984, under the direction of Dr. Walter Ellis,
Chairperson of the investigator's Dissertation Committee.

Special

assistance with the final revision of the instrument was provided by
Dr. Gary Johnson, a statistician; Dr. Mark Starr, a research
methodologist; Dr. George Guy, Professor of Education; Dr. Daniel
O'Toole, Associate Professor of Public Administration; and Dr. Ken
Kemper, Assistant Professor of Education.
The Research Population
The population selected for this research study, as shown in
Table X, was 694 faculty members with an academic appointment in one
of Oregon's three unionized 4-year institutions of higher education,
spring 1984.

Each subject of the identified population met the

following three criteria, as each: (1) held a full-time faculty
appointment during the 1983-84 academic year, (2) had been employed by
the institution a minimum of five years, and (3) had tenure or was on
a tenure track appointment in the school/department of the
university.
The population for this study was identified from the data base
used for November 8, 1983, payroll tapes and the EEO-6 report Fall
1983 for the subject institution.

This data was provided the

researcher by Ms. Mary E. Ricks, Research Assistant, of the Office for
Institutional Research at Portland State University (See Appendix D).
Although all respondents nominally met the three requirements above,
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TABLE X
Distribution of the Identified Population for the
Research Study in Oregon's Three Unionized
4-Year Institutions of Higher Education
Four Year Unionized
Institution

Percentage of the
Total Population

Number in
Population

Western Oregon State
College

129

( 18.6%)

Southern Oregon State
College

148

(21. 3'7.)

Portland State
University

417

(60.1'7.)

Total

694

(100.0'7.)

one respondent nevertheless indicated less than 5 years of teaching.
In order to secure permission to request the use of the data base,
the legal ramifications for requesting access to the data were
discussed with Mr.

Michael A. Corn,

Ass~stant

Legal Affairs, Portland State University.

to the President for

Therefore, permission to

secure and use the data base to identify the population for the study
was given to the investigator through the office of Dr. Margaret J.
Dobson, Vice President, Academic Affairs, Portland State University;
Dr. James H. Beaird, Provost, Western Oregon State College in Monmouth,
Oregon; and Dr. Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Academic Affairs, Southern
Oregon State College in Ashland, Oregon (See Appendix E).
The Data Collection
On

May 21, 1984, the research instrument "A Questionnaire to
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Study Collective Bargaining As a Process in Oregon's 4-Year
Institutions of Higher Education to Advance Faculty Members' Rights For
Participation in Institutional Governance" was mailed to the 694
subjects identified for this research study.

The questionnaire was

accompanied by a letter and self-stamped envelope for returning the
completed questionnaire to the investigator (See Appendix F).
A follow-up post card was mailed to the subjects on May 28, 1984,
with a second appeal letter, accompanied by a questionnaire and
self-stamped envelope, mailed on June 4, 1984, to all non-respondents,
as of that date (See Appendix G).
Questionnaires were returned to the investigator from 523 or 75.4%
of the population selected as subjects for the study between May 23,
1984, and August 10, 1984.

As shown in Table XI, 277 or 51.0% of the

questionnaires were returned from wave one, 100 or 20.6% were returned
following the second wave, while 109 or 22.4% of the respondent
questionnaires were returned following the third wave.
From the 523 questionnaires returned, 486 or 92.9% were accepted
as data-producing and used in the analysis process of the study.
However, in the presentation and analysis of the data, faculty
responses to each category of the research instrument may not total
486, because the academicians did not always respond to each item of
the instrument.
Thirty-seven or 7.1% of the returned questionnaires were rejected
for use in the study because of:

(1) incomplete data, (2) the

educator, while retaining faculty rank and tenure in the subject
institution, now holds an administrative position, and (3) the
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TABLE XI

DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES RECEIVED
ACCORDING TO EACH WAVE BY EMPLOYING 4-YEAR UNIONIZED
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN OREGON
Number of Data-Producing Respon •• s
Received With Each Wave/Request
Firat Wave
Hay 22-30,
1984
Institution

N

(7.)

Second Wave
Hay 31-

June 5, 1984
N

(7.)

Third Wave
June 6-Augu8t
10, 1984
N

Total

(7.)

Western Oregon State
College

45 (56.3)

18 (22.5)

17 (21.3)

80

Southern Oregon State
College

47 (47.0)

30 (30.0)

23 (23.0)

100

Por tland St. te
University

185 (60.5)

52 (11.0)

69 (22.5)

306

Total

277 (57.0)

100 (20.6)

109 (22.4)

486

questionnaire was received after August 10, 1984.
While 523 faculty members returned the received instruments to the
investigator, 171 chose to not participate in the study and did not
return the questionnaire.

From the total data available, the

non-respondents can be profiled, as shown in Table XXII, according to:
(1) employing institution, (2) academic area of appointment, and
(3) academic rank.

Following the selection of usable questionnaires for the study,
the questions were coded and a "Respondent Codebook - Collective
Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in
Institutional Governance" was written for key-punching the data for
computer analysis (See Appendix H).
a9.

Missing responses were recorded as
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TABU: XII
DIS!llIBUl'ION OF -:HE ?ROFt1..E O!A.R.AC':'tRISTIC
DATA OF TIlE ~ON-i\.ESPONDEN1S

:ionresponden~~

~1iI,pondents

~'!".)

rocoil

(1..)

:mployins; !nstltut,1on
<USC

sese
?SU

roeal

.2
II
98

0 •.• )
(23.])
(2 •• J)

,0
lOO
306

(65.5 )
(76.J)
(75.7)

Ul
'-'>.

lit

(26.0)

436

( 74.0)

557

llO

(27.71
(24.Z)

9

(22.0 )

ZS7
l63
J2

(n.J)

32

( 78.0)

397
215
.l

lit

( 26.2)

'-il2

(73.3)

553

93
39
~7
2

(26 •• )
(25.2 )
(29.J)
(2.LZ)

259
liS
41

(73.0 )
(74.3 )

J52
234

(70. ])

7

(77.3)

38
9

lit

(26.2)

432

(73.3)

;53

l22

::Jepartmenc"
Liberal Arts/Arc!!
?rofesei.onal
Ot.her

e.

Total

Sci.

(75.3)

Academic Rank-

?roies8or
A'.ccLate ?rotusor
A•• 1sCant ?retessor
!nllt.%'1Jct.or/Othet"

1'oc.al

"Four respondents d1c1 noe indic.ate veparcnent or :t.ank

The Data Analysis
The data analysis for this study was completed by selecting
appropriate statistical programs from the (SPSSx) Batch System.

Among

the research statistical techniques selected to study the data were:
means, percentages, frequency distributions, reliability and ANOVA.
More precisely, the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test was used to
further explore the sum scores or to identify sub-groups of the
respondents whose answers generated significantly different
sub-scores.
A complete presentation and analysis of the study's data is
presented in Chapter IV, with the conclusions drawn from the data
prese~t~d

~n ~hsp:er

V.

CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction
Chapter IV deals with the data and findings resulting from the
study.

The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective

Bargaining As a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in
Institutional Governance" was used to collect the data for this
investigation.
To aid in the presentation and analysis of data, Chapter IV was
written in two major sections.

The first section presents the results

of the demographic data specific to the three major areas of the
research instrument: (1) Respondent Information, 2) Institutional
Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.
The second section of Chapter IV presents an analysis of the
interaction between select independent variables from Part I -Respondent Information of the research instrument and the dependent
variables of the research model (1) professional interests, (2) economic
interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic and personnel
policies specific to Part III -- Institutional Governance Issues of the
instrument. This statistical information was used to test the four
hypotheses of the research study.
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H:l

The collective bargaining process has affirmed the
professional interests of the academician with an appointment
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

H:2

Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year
institutions of higher education, has provided for the
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making
process related to the economic interests of the institution.

H:3

Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining the institution's educational policy on
academic issues.

H:4

Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the
opportunity to participate in determining the academic and
personnel policies of their employment.
Respondent Information
Years Of Full-Time Teaching In A
4-Year Institution of Higher Education

Respondents

(~=

483) reported a range of less than 5 and more than

25 years of full-time academic teaching within a 4-year institution of
higher education.

While only 1 respondent had taught in higher

education for fewer than 5 years, 72 of the total respondents had held
an academic appointment for more than 25 years.

As shown in Table XIII,

the largest sub-group consists of those respondents who have taught
between 16-20 years in a 4-year system of higher education.
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TABLE XIII
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING INSTITUTION
AND YEARS OF FULL-TIME TEACHING IN A 4-YEAR
INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Years of Full Time Teaching Years in a

4-Year Institution of Higher Education
Oregon's Unionized
4- Year Institutions
of Higher Education

1-4

5-10

1l-15

yrs.

yrs.

yrs.

6

21
27
69
117

Western Oregon State Col.

Southern Oregon State Col.
Portland State University

Total Population

31
37

16-20
YTS.

24
34
87
145

21-25

Over

yrs.

25 yrs.

19
27
65
III

9

12
51
72

Membership in The American Association
of University Professors (AAUP)
In those Oregon 4-year institutions of higher education where
academicians have selected collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode, respondents at Western Oregon State College report only
a 6.6% membership in AAUP, with a 6.3% membership reported at Southern
Oregon State College and a 44.9 %membership reported for Portland State
University.

As Table XIV illustrates, the majority of the respondents

do not hold membership in AAUP.

This includes a 55.1% non-membership

reported by 206 respondents at Portland State

Universi~y,

where AAUP is

the collective bargaining agent for faculty members' contracts.
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TABLE XIV
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING UNIONIZED
INSTITUTION AND MEMBERSHIP IN (AAUP) AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
Membership in (AAUP) American Association of University Professors
Oregon I 5 Unionized
4-Year rns t i tu t ions

Frequencies

of Higher Education

Q

Y

N

l!

(6.6 ) (93.4)

89

(6.3) (93.7)

133

163

(44.9) (55.11

144

323

(30.8) (69.2)

Western Oregon State Col.

(N

Percent

N

Y

76)

Southern Oregon State Col.

(N • 95)
Portland State University
(N • 296)
Total Population
(N .467)

Faculty Members' Involvement In Institutional
Academic Collective Bargaining
The majority of the respondents reported nonparticipation in their
institution's academic collective bargaining process.

Table XV shows

the extent of involvement in the collective bargaining process reported
by respondents in each of the three unionized institutions.

TABLE XV
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE COLLECTIVE
9ARGAINING PROCESS, BY INSTITUTION
rnvo 1vemen t

In the Collective 3ar.gaining Process

No Involvement
Slightly Active
Active
!/ery Active

Western Oregon
S tate College

:!.
36
22
10
12

(~"

(45.0)
(27.5)
Cl2.5)
Cl5.0)

Southern Oregon
State College
N

(.9

32
10
8

(7.)

(49.5)
(32.3)
(10.1l
(8. II

Portland State
University
N

214
60
22
10

(7.)

(69.9)
(9.6)
(7.2)
(3.3)
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Analysis of involvement by institution indicates while 27.5% of
Western Oregon State College faculty respondents were slightly involved
in the collective bargaining process for their institution, 45% of the
respondents selected to have no involvement in the process.

This same

pattern of respondent involvement in the bargaining process was reported
at Southern Oregon State College where 32.3% of the respondents were
slightly involved in the process and 49.5% of the faculty respondents
selected no involvement in institutional bargaining.

At Portland State

University, 9.6% of the faculty respondents indicated they were slightly
involved with the bargaining process; 69.9% have indicated
nonparticipation in the process.
Age Of Respondents
Table XVI shows the distribution of the faculty respondents' age
range.
TABLE XVI
INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
RESPONDENTS BY AGE RANGE
30-39
yrs.

Employing 4-Year
Unionized Institution

N

2
Western Oregon State Col.
Southern Oregon State Col. 3
Portland State University 25

?

2

15.8, df

s

6:

p

2

.015

(1.)

(2.5)
(3.0)
(8.2)

40-49
yr ••
N

(1.)

SO-59
yr ••
N ("I.)

60 or
above

Total

N

N

("I.)

(l~)

29 (36.5) 43 (53.5) 6 0.5) 80 (100)
43 (43.0) 42 (42.0) 12 (12.0) 100 (100)
III (36.3) 115 (37.8) 55 (17.9) 306 (100)

N 2 486

The respondents' age range in the study was from 30 to more than 60
years.

The greatest percentage of Western Oregon State College

respondents are in the 50-59 year age range.
Oregon College

(~=

While at both Southern

43) and Portland State University (n

=

115) the
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greatest number of the respondents reported their age in the 40-49
range.
Furthermore, as Table XVII illustrates, while the largest number of
respondents holding the academic rank of professor were between 50-59
years of age, the largest group of associate professors who responded to
this question were between 40-49 years of age.
TABLE XVII
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY
ACADEMIC RANK AND AGE RANGE
Age
Academic Rank

30-39
yrs.
5
20
3

Professor
Assoc 1a te Prof easer
Ass is tant Prof esscr
Instructor

I
I

Other.
Total Population

30

40-49

50-59

60 or

yrs4

yrs.

over

75
83
20

123
61
13

56
11
5

2
199

72

I

2
181

Total

259
175
41
2
4
482

University/Departmental Academic
Governance Bodies
From the total population for the study

(! = 486),

during the

1983-84 academic year, 259 respondents were appointed to a university or
departmental governance committee.
Membership in the Faculty Academic Senete was held by 28.1% of the
Western Oregon State College respondents, by 33.3% of the 54 Southern
Oregon State College total respondents and by 29.1% of the 148 Portland
State University respondents.
While only 14.0% of the Western Oregon State College respondents
and 20.4% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents were members
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of the institution's Rank and Tenure Committee, 33.1% of Portland
State's faculty respondents were appointed to this committee.
Faculty respondents, as shown in Table XVIII, were least
represented by membership appointment to the Institutional Finance
Committees. At Portland State University, 3.4% of the respondents held
an appointment to the committee, while 8.8% of Western Oregon State
College and 5.6% of Southern Oregon State College respondents reported
an appointment to their Institutional Finance Committee(s).

bble XVIII

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ay UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL
COVERNAllCE BODIES AllD THE EMPLOYING INSTITUTION

University Depart.,ental Academic

Governance Bodies

Wes tern Oregon
State College
~

(1.)

Southern Oregon
State College
N

(':'.)

Faculty Academic

Senate

?or1:1and
State
University
N

(7.)

16 (28.1)

18 (33.3)

43 (29.1)

Finance Committee

5

(8.8)

(5.6 )

(3.4)

Rank and Tenure
Committee

8 (14.0)

11 (20.4)

49 (33.1)

Other Policy-Making
Committe.

28 (49.1)

22 (40.7)

51 (34.5)

Total

57

S4

148

Further analysis indicates that the greater number (136) of the 259
respondents reporting an appointment to a governing committee (either in
the department or university), held the academic rank of professor.

The

faculty respondent membership on the four governance committees listed
on the research instrument: (1) faculty academic senate, (2) finance,
(3) rank and tenure, and (4) other policy-making committees are shown in
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Table XIX.
During the 1983-84 academic year, in addition to the three specific
governance committees used for the research instrument, respondents
reported membership on such other policy-making committees as:

(1) Academic Requirements, (2) Curriculum, (3) Committee on
Committees, (4) Teacher Education, and (5) Graduate Studies.

TABLE XIX
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC
RANK AND UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE COMMUTtES

University Depart-

Professor

mental Academic
Governance Committees

N

Faculty Academic
Senate

42 (30.9)

Finance Committee
Rank and Tenure
Ccmmittee

9

(7.)

(6.6)

Associate
Professor
N

(7.)

24 (26.4)
2

Assistant
Professor

(2.2)

N

9 (34.6)

1

2

(7.7)

-

37 (27.2)

24 (26.4)

5 (19.2)

-

48 (35.3)
136

41 (45.1)
91

10 (38.5)
26

-

Other Pol1cy-Mak ing
Committee

Total

Instructor/
Other

(7.)

Salary
In the questionnaire seven intervals were provided to determine the
salary range of the faculty respondents on a 9-month academic year
contract during the 1983-84 academic year.

The respondents reported

salaries ranging from $10,000 to more than $40,000 for 1983-84 academic
year contracts.

While two respondents reported a salary between

$10,000-$15,000 range, 176 of the respondents earned between
$26,000-$30,000.

Table XX provides a summary of the salary range.
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TABLE :c<
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY SALARIES
Salary rntervaLs
Dollar./9 month.

10,000-15,000
16,000-20, 000
21,000- 25 ,000
26,000-30,000
31,000-35,000
36,000-40,000
40 ,OOO-over
Total

~umber

,

14
129
176
108
40
13
482*

Percent.

0.4
2.9
26.7
36.5
22.4
8.3
2.7
100

*H1ssing values. 4

Table XXI reports salaries by institution.

The table reveals while

two or 2.0% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents are in' the

$10,000-$15,000 salary range, 50 faculty respondents or half of their
total respondents have salaries ranging from $26,000-$30,000.

Portland

State University also reported the greatest percentage, 33.6%, of the

1983-84 respondents' salary contracts were in the $26,000-$30,000
interval.

Western Oregon State College respondents reported 37 or 47.4%

of the total respondents' salaries were between $21,000-$25,000 for 9
months, with 24 or 30.8% of the faculty respondents reporting a salary
of $26,000-$30,000.
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TABLE XXI
SALARY DISTRIBUTION FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS
BY EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION
Western Oregon

Salary Interval
Do11aro/9 month
10,000-15, 000
16,000-20,000
21,000-25,000
26,000-30,000
31,000-35,000
36,000-40,000
over 40.000
Total

State College
N

(1.)

3
37
24
6
7
1
78

0.8)
(47.4)
(30.8)
(7.7)
(9.0)
(1.3)

Southern Oregon
State College
N

Portland State
University

(1.)

2
1
26
50
19
2

2.0
(t.0)
(26.0)
(50.0)
(19.0)
(2.0)

100

N

(1.)

10
66
102
83
31
12
304

(3.3)
(21. 7)
(33.6)
(27.3)
(10.2)
(3.9)

Further examination of the salary ranges shows that in all three
academic areas the greatest percentage of the faculty respondents
employed are within the salary interval of $26,000-$30,000 for the
1983-1984 academic year on a 9 month's contract.

The percentages of

faculty respondents in the $26,000-$30,000 salary interval by academic
areas were: Liberal Arts, 38.6%; Professional

~chools,

32.2% (See Table XII).

TABLE XXII
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY BY ACADEMIC AREA
FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS
Academic Area

Salary Interval
Dol1ars/9 month.
10,000-15,000
16,000-20,000
21,000-25,000
26,000-30,000
31,000-35.000
36.000-40,000
over 40 ,000
Total

Liberal Arts:
Collegel
Departmentl
School
~

1
6
87
llO
61
13
7
285

(1.)

(0.4)
(2.1)
(30.5)
(38.6)
( 21.4)
(4.6)
(2.5)

Professional
School
~

1
5
32
55
40
24
5
162

('!.)

(0.6)
(3.1)
( 19.8)
(34.0)
(24.7)
(14.8)
(3.1)

Others
~

(1.)

3
9
10
6
3

(9.71
(29.0)
(32.3)
(19.4)
(9.71

31

34.0%; Others
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Additional analysis revealed that of the 478 faculty respondents
reporting their salary ranges, 37.2% or 96 of the respondents with the
academic rank of professor earned between $26,000-$30,000 for a 9
months' academic year appointment.

While 80 or 46.2% of the respondents

with the academic rank of associate professor earned between
$21,000-$25,000,67.5% or 27 of the respondents holding the rank of
assistant professor were employed in the same salary range.

Table XXIII

presents respondents' salaries within the four academic ranks of the
university system.
TAllLE :<XIII
SALARY INTERVAL DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY
RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC RANK

Academlc Rank

Salary Interval
Oollarsl9 month.

10,000-15,000
16,000-20,000
21,000-25,000
26,000-30,000
31. 000- 35,000
36 ,000 -40 ,000
over 40 ,000
Total

Professor

t:!.

(;.)

1 (0,4)
2 (0,8)
18 (7,0)
96 ()7 ,2)
95 (36.8)
34 ( U,2)
12 (4,7)
258

AssOCiate

Aseistant

[n9truetorl

?rofessor

?roiessor

Other

t:!.

(?)

1 (0.0)
6 (3.5 )
80 (46.2)
74 (42.S)
7' (4.0)
5 (2.9)
173

!!.

(7.)

N

(~.)

4
Z7
4
4
1

(10,0)
(67,S)
(10,0)
(10.0)
( 2.5)

1

( 1.0)
(2,0)
( 1.0)
(1.0 )

-1
-
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Institutional Influences
Introduction
The data for the second main area of the research instrument are
presented to identify those contextual factors, either external or
internal to a 4-year university system, which were perceived in 1983 to
be an influencing factor in faculty respondents' decision to vote for a
new institutional academic collective bargaining contract.
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Those faculty respondents voting for a new institutional contract
responded to 13 statements on the research instrument.

The issues

specific to each statement had the potential to affect the governance
structure and functions of the institution.

Using a 5-point Likert

Scale, voting faculty respondents recorded their response to the 13
listed factors as an influencing or non-influencing factor in their
decision to vote for a contract renewal.
A total presentation of the respondents' data specific to each of
the 13 statements is illustrated by Table XXIV (See Appendix I).

The

frequency of response, as well as the percentage based upon the total
number of responses for each statement, is presented.
The data can be further statistically analyzed to present
additional important findings specific to each of four data subsets:
(1) funding, (2) decision-making process/bodies, (3)organizational
change, and (4) students.

These findings are as follows:

(1) Funding - the impact that federal, state, or institutional
funding had on the conduct of faculty research or program development in
the subject institution formed questions 8, 9, 11 of the research
instrument.
While 114 of the faculty members were in disagreement with
statement 9, "Federal funds appropriated for research have been
reduced," III of the 419 respondents were undecided about the statement
as a contextual factor of significance to them in voting for contract
renewal in 1983.
Statements 8 and 11, as shown in Table XXV, were reported as
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significant contextual factors in the respondents' decision to vote for
a contract renewal.

At Southern Oregon State College, 42 of the total

90 respondents and 104 of the 261 respondents from Portland State
University reported they strongly agree with statement 8, "State
legislative funding was reduced for your institution." Furthermore, the
importance of state funding as an influencing force is agreed upon by
104 of the Portland State University respondents and 33 of the 72
respondents from Western Oregon State College.
Statement 11, "Limited instructional funds have decreased the
development of academic programs" was reported as a significant
contextual factor for 177 of the 423 respondents voting in 1983 for a
contract renewal.

A further analysis of the statement by academic

institution (See Table XXV) shows the statement was of significance to
faculty members holding an academic appointment during the 1983-84
academic year, in each of the three unionized 4-year institutions in
Oregon's system of higher education.
(2) Decision-Making Process/Bodies important to faculty members'
governance and function within the academy were studied by questions 12
through 16 of the research instrument.
To statement 14, "The faculty senate/council has become less
effective as governance bodies," and 16, "There was a reduced sense of
collegiality among faculty," the investigator found respondents in each
of the three unionized 4-year institutions agreed that these were
significant contextual factors in their decision to vote for a contract
renewal.

As demonstrated in Table XXVI, 30 of the 70 Western Oregon

TABLE XXV
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
8 AND 11 OF TIlE RESEARCH INSTRUHENT BY
THE EMPLOYING ACADEHIC SETTING

Frequency
Institutional Influencea
Employing Academic
Settings

6.

Agree
('1.)
!!

Undecided

!!

(1.)

Dlasgree

!!

(7.)

Strongly
Dlasgree
N

(7.)

Totsl
Population

State leglalative
funding was reduced
for your institution
WOSC

11 05.3'1.)

33 (45.6'1.)

6 01.1'1.)

SOSC

42 (46.7'1.)

31 (34 .4'1.)

4

(4.4'1.)

104 (39.9'1.)

104 (39.9'1.)

16

(6.9'1.)

12 06.7'1.)

34 (47.2'1.)

PSU
11.

Strongly
Agree
('1.)
!!

17 (23.6'1.)

3 (44.2'1.)

72

2

(2.2'1.)

02.2'1.)

90

21

(8.l'1.)

14

(5.4'1.)

261

3

(4.2'1.)

72

Limited institutional funds have
decreased the development of academic
programs.
WOSC

9 (12.5'1.)

14 (19.4'1.)
(2.2'1.)

sose

28 (31.1'1.)

41 (45.6'1.)

9 00.0'1.)

PSU

85 (32.6'1.)

102 (39.1'1.)

29 (11.1'1.)

2

32 (12.3'1.)

10 (11.1'1.)

90

(5.0'1.)

261

13

co

N
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State College respondents, 26 of the 90 Southern Oregon State College
respondents, and 93 of Portland State University's 260 respondents
agreed with statement 14.

In response to statement 16, the investigator

found that 24 of the 70 Western Oregon State College respondents, 33 of
the 90 Southern Oregon State College respondents and 91 of the Portland
State University 260 respondents recorded agreement with the statement.
Statements 13 and 15 of the research instrument focused on the
Unpact of the decision-making process, as related to the development of
educational policy for the institutions at the state and departmental
level of governance.
To statement 13, (See Table XXVII) "The educational policy
decision-making rights of the central administration were controlled by
the state education agency," 82 of Portland State University's total 259
respondents recorded agreement with the statement, as did 23 of the
respondents from Southern Oregon State College.

At Western Oregon State

College only 19 of the 70 respondents agreed with the statement, while
28 or 34.3% disagreed that this statement was a significant contextual
factor in their decision to vote for a new institutional academic
collective bargaining contract.
As illustrated in Table XXVII, 82 of the 261 Portland State
University respondents answered in agreement with statement 15; "There
was a decline in the faculty members' influence in policy-making at the
departmental level," while 80 respondents disagreed that the statement
was a significant factor in their collective bargaining voting.
Twenty-eight or 40.0% of the Western Oregon State College faculty

TAULt: XXVI
IllSTR16UTION OF Rt:SPONllt:NTS ACCORDING TO QUESTIONS
14 AND 16 OF TilE Rt:SEARCII INSTRUMENT BY
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Frequt!ncy
lnslilulional

Intluence~

Employ 1IIg Acctdcmic
Settings

14.

Agree!
(7.)
N

Strongly
Agrt!t!

N

(7.)

Undecided
(7.)
N

Disagree

N

(7.)

Disagree
(7.)
N

Totai
Population

The faculty academic
6cnate! council has
become less effective
a~ a governance body.

wose

16.

Strongly

(8.67.)

]0 (42.9%)

9 (12.97.)

19 (27.17.)

(8.67.)

70

sose

20 (22.27.)

26 (28.97.)

II <12.27.)

21 (2].37.)

12 (13.37.)

90

PSU

J3 (12.67.)

93 (35.67.)

56 (21.57.)

62 (23.87.)

17

(6.57.)
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wose

10 (13.97.)

24 (33.37.)

10 <13.9%)

21 (29.27.)

(9.rt.)

72

sose

13 (14.47.)

33 (36.77.)

15 (16.77.)

16 (17.87.)

13 <14.47.)

90

PSU

49 (18.97.)

91 (35.07.)

36 <13.97.)

62 (23.97.)

22 (18.57.)

260

6

6

Then: was a reduced
.~n"e

of

coll~8lallty

among the faculty.

OJ
P.

TABLE XXV II
DISTRIBUTION OF ."ACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
U !.Nil IS OF TilE RESEARC/I INSTRUMENT BY
EMPLOYING ACAllEMle INSTITUTION
frcqut!llcy
Influences
EmployinB Academic
Settings

Intililutiollal

U.

Strongly
Agree

N

(7.)

Agrec

N

(7.)

Undecided
(7.)
N

Olsijgrce
(7.)
N

Strong 1 y
Disagree

~

(7.)

Tolal

Population

'fhe L-ducaliona I polIcy dec Is ion-mak lng
rights of the institution's central ad-

ministration were
conlroll~d by lh~
utale educational
agency.

lIose

IS.

4

(5.77.)

19 (27.1·4)

14 (20.27.)

28 (34.37.)

12 (12.97.)

70

sose

12 (13.37.)

2] (25.07.)

22 (24.47.)

22 (24.4·4)

II (12.17.)

90

PSU

]2 (12.47.)

82 (] 1. 77.)

02 (2].9·4)

01 (23.07.)

(8.57.)

259

12 (17.17.)

28 (40.07.)

(4.37.)

20 (26.07.)

( 10.07.)

70

22

Tllcre was a decline
In tht! faculty memberH' inC luenccs on
policy decislon-

making at tllc de-

partmental
1I0se

lev~l.

sose

10 (11.17.)

17 (I8.97.)

IS (Io.14)

28 (] 1. 17.)

20 (22.27.)

90

PSU

49 (16.87..,

62 (] 1.47.)

23

(8.87.)

80 (30.14)

27 (10.]7.)

201

(Xl

U1
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recorded agreement with the statement, while 28 or 31.1% of the Southern
Oregon State College respondents disagreed that the statement was of
significance to their institution.
(3) Organizational changes -- statement(s) 10, 18 and 19 of the
research instrument address those factors in the organizational
structures and functions that can influence a faculty member to vote in
support of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance
mode for an institution. Specific data analysis of the questions reveals
the following:
(A)

A substantive number of the institutional respondent subsample
groups disagree with statement 10, "The structural size of the
institution has grown rapidly during the preceding five
years." As shown in Table XXVIII, 42 of the 68 Western Oregon
State College respondents, 60 of the Southern Oregon State
College 86 total respondents, as well as 149 of the 215
Portland State University respondents recorded a disagreement
with the statement.

(B)

About half of the Portland State University respondents
recorded disagreement with statements 18 and 19 (See Table
XXVIII). However, statement 18, "The institution has developed
and implemented a new mission and goal statement," was a
significant contextual factor to respondents at Western Oregon
State College where 34 of the 71 respondents were in agreement
that a new mission and goal statement(s) had been developed
and implemented in their university system.

TAULE XXV III
DISTRIUUTlON or FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
10, IH, AND 19 OF TilE RESEARCII INSTRUHENT
BY EHI'LOY ING ACADEH1C INSTITUTION

rrcquem:y
Instltutlonal luf lucnceu
imploylug Academ1C

Settings

10.

Slrongly
N

Strongly
Agree

Agl'"ee

(7.)

N

(7.)

Undecided
(7.)
N

Ditiagrec

N

(%)

Disagree

~

(7.)

Total
Popul allon

TIIC slructural size
01 lhe instituti.on
has grown rapidly

durillg the preceding
f !tica 1 year.
(2.9'k)

\lOse

18.

9 (19.I·k)

16 (13.27.)

26 (36.27.)

16 (26.57.)

68

SOSC

6

<7.0%)

II ((2.8%)

9 (10.57.)

31 (36.17.)

29 (33. 77.)

86

PSU

8

(3.17.)

38 (14.77.)

63 (24.47.)

95 (36.87.)

54 (20.97.)
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4

(5.67.)

30 (42.37.)

12 (16.97.)

19 (26.87.)

(8.57.)

71

The institution has

developed and implemented new mh&ion and
goa 1 staLements.

\lOSC

19.

6

sose

4

(4.57.)

2] (25.87.)

26 (29.27.)

18 (20.2'1.)

18 (20.27.)

89

PSU

4

( 1.57.)

43 (16.67.)

74 (28.67.)

98 ()7.8·k)

40 (15.47.)

259

9 (12.97.)

]9 (55.77.)

(8.6·k)

J) (18.57.)

(4.37.)

70

sose

<7.97.)

26 (29.27.)

22 (24.77.)

17 (19.17.)

17 (19. II.)

H9

PSII

(3.57.)

60 (23.2'1.)

74 (28.6·k)

81 01.37.)

35 (13.57.)

259

The institution hss deulgncd and implemented

a

n~w

organizational

structure.

\lose

9

6

co
.....
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Furthermore, statement 19, "The institution has designed
and implemented a new organizational structure," was
identified as an influencing factor for 70 faculty members at
Western Oregon State College, where 48 or 68.6% of the
respondents recorded agreement with the statement.

In

addition, 33 of the total 89 respondents at Southern Oregon
State College agreed that their decision to vote for contract
renewal had been influenced by a new institutional
organizational design and structure.

However, 34 of the

institution's respondents were in disagreement with the
statement.
D.' Students

Statements 7 and 17 on the questionnaire are specific to student
issues, which could be perceived as influencing factors in a faculty
member's decision to support academic collective bargaining.
While only 45 of 421 respondents agreed with statement 17, "Student
power has increased on the campus," a decline in student enrollment was
identified as an influencing factor by 40 or 55.5% of the total 72
respondents (See Table XXIX) from Western Oregon State College in their
decision to vote for a renewal of the institutional bargaining
contract.
Institutional Governance Information
Introduction
Academic institutional governance was the third area of inquiry for

TABLE XXIX
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY RESPONSES TO QU~STIONS SEVEN
AND SEVENTEEN OF TIlE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 8¥
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION
Frequency
Intil ilut 10na1 lnf lucnces
Employing Acaucmic
Settings

7.

Slrongly
Agree

N

(7.)

Slrongly
Agree
(7.)
N

Undecided
N

(7.)

Disagree
N

(7.)

Disagree

N

(7.)

TOlal

Population

Tilt! ln~llLu['on was
expel lcnclng a de-

cline in sLudent
enrol hnent.

IIOSC

8 (11.17.)

32 (44.47.)

SOSC

(2.37.)

(5.67.)

16 (22.27.)

12 (16.77.)

72

10 (11.47.)

15 (17.17.)

30 (]4.1;.)

31 (]5.27.)

88

(].27.)

67 (25.97.)

47 (18.27.)

86 (]3.27.)

43 (16.67.)

259

IIOSC

(2.87.)

(9.97.)

13 (18.37.)

32 (45.17.)

17 (23.97.)

71

SOSC

0

(0.0"1.)

17 (J8.97.)

( 7.8%)

41 (45.67.)

25 (27.8%)

90

PSU

0

(0.07.)

19

( 7.37.)

50 (19.77.)

125 (48.1;.)

66 (25.97.)

260

PSU
17.

16

4

Student power haa
lncrca~ed

on the

campus.

ex>

'"
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this study.

This process includes both the formal decision-making

structures used within a university system, which have the potential to
affect relationships, procedures and policies.
Four sub-sets of data are presented. (1) professional interests,
(2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/
personnel policies specific to academic governance issues.
Professional Interests
The first subset of data specific to academic governance includes
respondents'. reported perceptions to the impact that academic collective
bargaining had upon their professional prestige within the employing
institution.
As shown in Table XXX (See Appendix J), the research instrument
studied eight professional interest statements.

As the data reveals,

respondents were in disagreement or strong disagreement with seven
statements (20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) of the survey.

In brief, the

data suggest respondents do not agree that academic collective
bargaining has provided them with:
(1)

An academic milieu supportive of the pursuit of scholarship.

(2)

A collegial relationship with administration.

(3)

A professional, rather than employee, status to their role in
the institution.

(4)

An increased interest in the function and role of the faculty
senate/council.

(5)

Involvement in the selection process for the appointment of an
administrator to a central or departmental administration
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position.
(6)

An influence in setting institutional standards for academic
performance.

(7)

The right to participate in policy-making on educational
issues that have the potential to affect public opinion about
the institution.

However, to statement No. 22 (See Table XXXI), 226 of the 474
respondents agreed that academic collective bargaining has provided them
with "a formalized structure and process for institutional
decision-making" in their employing university system.
Economic Interests
The second subset of data specific to academic governance is
respondents' reported perception to academic collective bargaining as a
facilitator for institutional economic interests.
As illustrated in Table XXXII (see Appendix K), the data suggest
that, as an aggregate, the respondents do not agree academic collective
bargaining has:

(1) provided the faculty with a higher public profile

specific to budgetary issues in Oregon's system of higher education,
(2) encouraged the university budgetary affairs committee to link budget
planning to institutional academic goals, (3)

provi~ed

for faculty input

into the long-range budgeting planning modes of the institution, or
(4) generated additional money for the faculty salary scale in Oregon's
system of higher education.
However, additional analysis of the data (See Table XXXIII)

TABLE XXXI
t'ACULTY HEMB~RS' PERCEPTIONS ot' TilE IMPACT OF
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE! PROCESS
Frequency

Strongly
Institutional Governance Information

Agree

Employing Academic Selling

N

22.

('4)

Undecided

Agree
N

(7.)

N

(7.)

6

0,77.)

Dis-

Strongly

TOlal

agree

Disagree
N
(7.)

Respondents

N

(7.)

]1

(26.9%)

A formalized structure and
process for institulional

deFlalon-maklng
IIOSC

(5. I',)

32 (41.07.)

(B.3?)

36 (31.57.)

12 (12.57.)

24 (25.07,)

16 (16.

(9.1%) lOb (35.37.)

60 (20.07.)

14 (24.17.)

]1

sose

8

PSU

29

Total Responst!s

4

15 ([9.27.)

~

1~

ro

119

78

n.)

96

(10.)7.)

)00

51

414

\0
N

TABLE XXX III
RESPONIJENTS 0 I'ERCEI'T10NS TO STATEMENTS
(29. 30. 31. 34 OR 36) ECONOMIC
INTEREST IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE
F.-cquency

Strongly
Institution

Southern
Oregon Slate

College

Economic Interest
Statement

Agree
N

(7.)

AgI"CC

N

(7.)

Dis-

Undecided

!!

(7.)

agr-ce

N

(7.)

Strongly
DilSsgn:c

N

Total

Respondents

7.

29. Clarify the problem
of a low faculty salary
schedule in Oregonls
system Qf higher education.

9 (9.37.)

44 (45.47.)

10 (10.37.)

16 (\b.57.)

18 (18.67.)

97

3~.

4 (4.17.)

39 (39.87.)

26 (26.57.)

19 (19.47..)

10 (1D.27.)

98

31. Strengthen your input
InlO ahort-range university budget planning and
decision-making.

4 (4.27.)

3D ()9.67.)

19 (19.87.)

22 (22.97.)

13 (13.57.)

98

34. Assisted the faculty and
administration [0 prescnt

7 (7.37..)

3 I 02.07.)

28 (28.97.)

17 (17.57.)

14 (14.47.)

97

32 (10.77.) 105 (35.27.)

42 (14.17..)

92 ()0.97.)

27

(9.17.)

298

(8.97.)

26 (34.27.)

9 (25.37.)

79

Increased the importance

of budgetary/financial
affairs conmiLtec's role
in university budH,et an-

aly.l. and planning.

a uni tcd agreement to the
state legislature.

Portland
State

University

Weslern
Oregon Slale

College

29. Clarify the problem
of a low faculty salary
schedule in Oregon' B
Bystem of higher educalion.
30. IncrcaBed the imporlance

3 (6.37.)

31 <25.37.)

10

of budgetary/financial
affairs corrrnillec's role
In university hudget analYSis and planning.

..0
W
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suggests that the academic collective bargaining process, for many
Southern Oregon College respondents, is perceived as having
(1) clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's
system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the
budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget
analysis and planning, (3) assisted the faculty and administration to
present a united agreement to the state legislature, and (4) increased
their salary and fringe benefits for the system.
Furthermore, this analysis reveals that while 137 of the 298
Portland State University respondents agree with statement 29 of the
research instrument, which states that "collective bargaining clarified
the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of
higher education," 119 respondents disagreed with the statement.
In addition, 35 of the 79 Western Oregon State College respondents
agree that the collective bargaining process has provided an "increase
in the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role
in university budget analysis and planning." However, 35 of the 79
respondents disagreed with the statement.
Educational Policies
The academic community has established a tradition to assure the
academician's rights for active participation in determining the
educational policies of a university system, as well as establishing
those institutional procedures that govern the educational process:
(1) teaching, (2) programs, or (3) students (Sands, 1971).

This right

for the academician may be further supported in the university setting
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.

by the acceptance of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance
mode.
In Oregon, data (See Table XXXIV) of this study suggest faculty
respondents do not agree that it has been necessary to implement
academic collective bargaining in order to assure the faculty members'
right to determine educational policies and procedures in their
institutions.

Their perceptions are further supported by the following

select respondents' comments: (1) "Collective Bargaining has had no
effect here. Faculty participation remains the same," (2) "No effect,"
3) "Collective Bargaining is only one factor, and a minor one," (4) "No
difference now than before collective bargaining," (5) ''We never have a
problem in this area," (6) "To a large extent, these were already in
place."
Academic and Personnel Policies
University educators have the primary governance authority for all
matters related to faculty status (AAUP, 1984).

This study

investigated collective bargaining's impact in providing the
opportunity for faculty members employed in Oregon's unionized
institutions to participate in determining policies related to:
(1) academic duties, (2) academic standards and personnel policies, and
(3) support services.

For this data subset, the respondents were

requested to record their responses on a four-part scale:

(1) always,

(2) frequently, (3) infrequently, and (4) never.
As shown in Table XXXV, the responses to items 44, 45, and 46 of
the research instrument indicate that the acceptance of collective

TABLE XXXIV
fACUI.H MEMIIERS' PERCEPTION Uf TIlE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC
COLI.ECT! VE BARGAINING UN EDUCATIONAl. POLICY
DETERMINANTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE
Frequency
Strongly

Institutional Grievance

Educational Policies

Agree
N (1.)

Undc-

(1.)

clded
(1.)
N

(4.67.)

8S (18.51.)

Agree

N

37.

Academic Standards

(0.21.)

38.

Curriculum Content

3 (0.6l)

39

(6.37.)

84 (( 7.77.)

39.

Degree Requirements

(o.n)

)4

(J.n)

91 ((9.71)

40.

Grading Standards

(o.n)

26

(5.57.)

94 (19.8l)

41.

Slandards for Student Conduct and

(0.27.)

24

(o.n)

3 (O.6l)

DI.-

Strongly

agree

!!

(l)

244 (51.n)

Disagree

!!

Total
Respondent8

(l)

121 (25.47.)

476

226 (47.67.)

123 (25.97.)

475

229 (46.2l)

120 (25.37.)

475

228 (48.0l)

126 (26.57.)

475

(5.07.) 102 (21.47.)

229 (48.17.)

120 (25.27.)

476

26

(5.57.)

87 (16.4l)

229 (48.47.)

130 (27.57.)

473

))

(J .07.)

105 (22.n)

215 (45.47.)

116 (24.9l)

474

22

Discipline
42.

Types of Degrees Offered

43.

Establishment of Educational Programs

'-D
(J\

TABLE XXXV
FACUl.TY RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING'S IMPACT ON ACADEMIC AND PERSONNEL
I'OLICIES IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE
Frequency
TaLa}
In~tltutional

Governance Academic
and Personnel Policies

Always

N

(7.)

Frequenlly Infrequently
N

(7.)

!!

(7.)

Never

!!

Fr-equency

7.

Academic Dutlea

44. Teaching AS81gnment

41

(9.2"k)

80 (18.07.) 132 (29.77.)

191 (43.07.)

444

45. Teaching Schedules

34

(7.77.)

83 (18.77.) 127 (28.67.)

200 (45.17.)

444

46. Teaching Loada

29

(6.67.)

76 (17.27.) 151 04.lt)

187 (42.27.)

443

(7.17.)

Academic Standards/Practices Policies for
47. Faculty Recruiunent

31

78 (17.87.) 148 (33.71)

182 (;1.51)

439

48. Faculty Promotion

55 (12.47.) 135 00.57.) 133 (20.01)

120 (27.17.)

443

49. Faculty Tenure

65 (14.5t) 137 (J0.57.) 133 (29.67.)

iii. (25.47.)

449

50. Academic freedao

64 (14.57.) 144 02.57.) 123 (27.87.)

112 (25.37.)

443

74 (17.07.) 155 (35.67.) 123 (28.27.)

B4 ((9.37.)

436
452

*51. Dismissal for Cauae
52. Salary Scale

42

(9.37.) 121 (26.87.) 151 03.47.)

138 (l0.57.)

53. Fringe Benefits

49 (ll.07.) 135 00.27.) 152 04.07.)

III (24.87.)

447

50 (11.17.)

450

*54. Grievance Procedures

125 (27.B7.) IBO (40.07.)

95 (21.17.)

Support Services

55. Office Space
56. Secretarial Help

12
10

(2.77.)
(2.37.)

32

0.27.) 127 (2B.77.)

271 (61.37.)

442

29

(6.67.) 127 (2B.77.)

276 (62.47.)

442

\0
-.I
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bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the respondents'
university system has not affected the faculty's opportunity to
participate in the academic issues related to teaching:
(2) schedule, and (3) load.

(1) assignment,

As respondents' corrments suggest: (1) "Our

collective bargaining has done very little that was not already being
done.

I believe that I have input into many academic and administrative

decisions, but I had this without collective bargaining;" (2) "We had
all of these prior to collective bargaining in my department;"
(3) "These do not relate to collective bargaining on our campus, in my

opinion;" and (4) "We do all of these, but not because of collective
bargaining."
Academic standards and personnel policy issues were investigated by
items 47,48,49,50,51,52,53, and 54 (See Table XXXV).

From the

faculty respondents' perceptions, the Unplementation of collective
bargaining has provided the opportunity for faculty to make policy
decisions related to the issues of: (1) dismissal for cause, and
(2) grievance procedures.

However, respondents do not tend to perceive

collective bargaining as providing the faculty members with an
opportunity to determine departmental personnel policies related to
"support or secretarial services."
Data Analysis Specific to The
Four Dependent Variable Subsets
This section of Chapter IV was developed to present an analysis of
the interaction(s) between select demographic data from Part I -
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Respondent Information and data specific to the four dependent variable
sets of the study: (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests,
(3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies.
Sum Scores for the Dependent Variable Sets
From the survey data, the population values for the sum scores
specific for the various sections of the research instrument are shown
in Table XXXVI.

This statistical information allows the investigator to

characterize the respondents' total responses to each of the summed
dependent variables.

Furthermore the Cronbach's Alpha, a measure of

internal consistency, was computed for four sections of the
questionnaire. Coefficients at .90, .89, .96, and .93 were obtained for
the sections on professional interests, economic interests, educational
policies and academic/personnel policies.

The high alpha values

obtained indicated individuals tended to answer questions within each
section consistently and supported the use of summed scores in
subsequent analysis.

TABLE XXXVI
POPULATION VALUES FOR THE SUM SCORE
N

Mean

StDev

(.95

cn

median

Professional Interest Issues

458

3.45

.882

(3.367,3.532)

3.50

Economic Interest Issues

459

3.36

.812

(3.284,3.436)

Educational Policy Issues

469

3.94

.764

(3.869,4.011)

Academic/Personnel Interest Issues

410

2.81

.741

(2.737,2.883)

2.82

Variable

min

max

1.13

5.00

3.44

1.00

5.00

4.00

2.00

5.00

1.00

4.00

The total respondents' sum-scores (see Table XXVII) for the two
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dependent variable sets, professional and economic interests, can be
characterized as undecided/disagree.

The respondents are best described

as in disagreement with the dependent variable concerned with
educational policies.

The fourth dependent variable of the study,

academic/personnel policies, is characterized by the data as
infrequent.

TABLE XXXVII
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE DEPENDENT
VARIABLE SUB-SETS ACCORDING
TO SUM-SCORES

Dependent
Variable Sub-Set

Median

Characteristics

Questions

Sum-Score

of Responses

Professional Interests

20-27

3.50

Undecided/Disagree

Economic

28-36

3.44

Undecided/Disagree

Educa tional Policie9

37-43

4.00

Di9agree

Academic/Personnel Pol1c ies

44-56

2.82

Infrequen t 1y

Int~rests

These sum variables, (1) professional interests, (2) economic
interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/ personnel
policies form the four hypotheses.

Therefore, the sum-scores for each

variable were further examined to statistically answer the research
question, "Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode by three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher
education been supportive of the faculty members' rights for
participation in institutional governance?"
Hypothesis Testing
In order to answer the research question, the four hypotheses of

101

the study were tested. The sum scores for the dependent variable set
were studied using nine independent variables: (1) the number of
teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education, (2) AAUP
membership, (3) salary, (4) governance, (5) age, (6) involvement in the
institution's bargaining process, (7) academic rank, (8) institution of
employment, and (9) departmental assignment. More precisely, the
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to identify
those sub-groups of the respondents whose answers generated
significantly different sum scores.
Two of the independent variables, academic rank and the number of
full-time teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education,
generated no significant statistical differences for any of the sum
variables.

However, seven of. the nine independent variables tested,

(see Table XXXVIII) at the 0.05 level, generated a statistically
significant difference for the summed dependent variables.

TABLE XXXVIII
KRUSKAL-WALLIS STATISTIC P-VALUES
FOR THE VARIABLES
Summed Dependent Variable Set
Independent
Variables

Professional Economic

Educational Academic/Personnel

Interests
(H:l)

Interests
(H:2)

AAUP Membersh ip

.0001

.0001

NS

NS

Salary

.0001

.0002

.0004

.0008

NS

NS

Governance Bodies

Age
Institutional In-

NS

NS

.0001

.0001

.005

.007

Policies
(H:))

.005
NS

Policies
(H:4)

NS

.03

.00)

.0001

NS

.0002

volvement With

Bargaining
Institution
Department
"NS":p >

0.05

NS

.03

.03

NS
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Hypothesis One (H:l)
To further explore H:l, the collective bargaining process has
affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education,
subgroup means were computed.
As a result of the one-way analysis of variance testing, no
significant statistical differences were found between the independent
variables, age, governance committee membership, or departmental
assignment and the sum data for the dependent variable, professional
interests.

However, as illustrated in Table XXXIX, the sum variables

and the demographic variables, AAUP membership, employing institution,
salary and involvement in bargaining, exhibited statistically
significant differences.

TABU XXXU

or SUB-ClOUP HUJlS POl 1ACULn
USPOIIDtIITS' naCEnIOIIS or AC.\])DIIC COLUCTIVI
!.U.CAI"IIIO AlII) nonsSIOIIAI. llITEUST ISSIIES

stlllLTIJIEOUS COtIPAIllSOIIS

•
136
305
(2) EaploJin, InoUtutlon
(.) Wlltom Or.,on SUto coUo"
(b) Sou thorn Or.,on IUto CoUo,o
(c) Portland SUte Unhoroit,.

73
93
292

3.ll++
3.43.
3.53++

140
162
152

3.23·
3.39.
3.70*,+

2114
106
40

3.673.20- ,.
3.012.69- ,+

(3) Solar,. for 9 .... Controct
(a) $10,000-$25,000

(b) $26,000-$30,000
$30 ,000

(c) avor

c.)

Ko Involv .._nt
(b) Sa,htl,. .... th.
(e) AcUvo

(d) Ver,. AcUvo

Aotl: + -

27

0.6$ hv.l, ... 0.005. * _ 0.001 ..... 0.0001
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As previously indicated, the respondents' answers related to the
sum variable, professional interests, were clearly skewed to the right
side of the research instrument's 5-point Likert Scale, used by the
faculty members to record their responses to each question:
(1) AAUP Membership - The respondents who are members of the

American Association of University Professors (AAUP) appear to be rather
undecided about whether or not academic collective bargaining has
provided support for their professional interests, whereas the
respondents who are not members of the AAUP seem closer to disagreement
that collective bargaining has provided such support.

Although the AAUP

nonmembers' mean score is 3.55, their responses are significantly closer
to the "disagree" category on the 5-point Likert scale, Wilcoxon z =
3.88, p

=

.0001.

(2) Employing Institution - The average scores range from 3.13 to
3.53 for the respondents employed by the three subject unionized
institutions.

These respondents reported scores are between the

"undecided" and "disagree" categories on the Likert scale. Respondents
employed by Western Oregon State College appear statistically to be more
undecided about the effects of the bargaining process in providing for
their professional interests than is the faculty group from Southern
Oregon State College and Portland State University.

These latter

groups' perception of the process, as the mean score shows, is
statistically closer to disagreeing that the process has provided for
their professional interests within the employing university system.
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(3) Salary - The mean scores for faculty respondents who have a
salary within the $10,000 - $25,000 range, as well as the $26,000 $30,000 salary range, suggest that these groups lean significantly more
toward being "undecided" about the association between the collective
bargaining process and their professional interest rights as an
academician, than does the group reporting salaries over $30,000 for a 9
month academic year (Q 3.3, p < 0.005, Table B.14 in Zar, p. 568).
(4) Involvement In The Process - Faculty members reporting no
involvement in the collective bargaining process perceptions are
significantly closer to "disagreeing"

th~t

the process has been a

facilitator of their professional interests in the employing university
setting, than do respondents reporting involvement in the process.
Hypothesis Two (H:2)
To further study if the collective bargaining as implemented in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education has provided for the
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process
related to the economic interests of the institution, simultaneous
comparisons of sub-group means were computed using the previously stated
nine independent variable and the sum-variable economic interests.
As a result of the additional testing, a statistically significant
relationship was identified (See Table XL) between the faculty
respondents' perceptions of academic collective bargaining as providing
for the institution's economic interests and five of the demographic
variables: (1) departmental appointment, (2) AAUP membership,
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(3) employing institution, (4) involvement in the institutional
bargaining process, and (5) salary.

No statistical association was

shown between this sum-variable and the independent variables of age and
membership in university or departmental governance committees.

TABLE XL

SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC INTEREST ISSUES

Economic Interests

Independent Variables

N

Average Scores

(1) Departmental Assignment

(a) Liberal ArtslSciences
(b) Professional Schools
(c) Others

267
156
32

3.29*
3.48*
3.41

132
310

3.11+++
3.46+++

75
96
288

3.53*,+
3.18+,*
3.37*

285
108
37
28

3.51* .** ,++
3.18++
3.12 .... ,*
2.88**

137
168
150

3.20++
3.29+

(2) AAUP Membership
(a) Yes
(b) No
(3)

Employing Institution
(a) Western Oregon State College
(b) Southern Oregon State College
(c) Portland State University

(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(5 )

No Involvement
Slightly Active
Active
Very Active

Salary
(a) $10,000-$25,000
(b) $26,000-$30,000
(c) Over $30,000

*: 0.05,

+:

0.01, **: 0.002, ...... : 0.001,

+++:

3.57+ I ++

0.0001

(1) Departmental Appointment - A statistically significant
difference was found at the p < O.05level between the departmental
appointments of the Liberal Arts/Sciences and the Professional Schools
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relative to the dependent variable "economic interests." Respondents
with an appointment in a professional school disagree more about
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental mode that has provided
for the participation in these processes related to the institution's
economic interests.

While respondents in the third departmental

sub-group "others" had no significant statistical relationship
identified, their mean score of 3.41, like the other departmental
groups, fell between the "undecided" and "disagree" categories on the
Likert Scale.
(2) AAUP Membership - For both the respondent groups selecting/not
selecting membership in the (AAUP) American Association of University
Professors, a statistically significant assessment was found at the
.0001 level.

Although faculty members with membership seem to be

"undecided" about the role that the bargaining process has provided for
the nonmembers' participation in the institution's "economic interests,"
their mean-score of 3.55 is closer to the "disagree" category on the
scale Wilcoxon Z

= 4.20,

p < .0001.

(3) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents at all three
institutions seem to lie on the "disagree" side of the "undecided"
category about academic collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode that has provided for the participation in those
processes specific to "economic interests." The findings indicate that
the respondents from Western Oregon State College and Portland State
University lean more toward the "disagree" category on the scale than do
the respondents employed at Southern Oregon State College.
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(4) Involvement in Bargaining - The IIno involvement" respondents
appear to perceive the process in relationship to their participation in
the issues related to the institution's "economic interests" nearer to
the IIdisagree" category on the S-point scale, with a mean score of 3.S 1,
than do respondents indicating very active involvement.
(S) Salary - All three groups of faculty respondents, according to
their salary range for the academic year, are "undecided" to "disagree"
about the collective bargaining process as a facilitator for the
lIeconomic interests" of their university system.

The respondents with

an academic year income over $30,000 are significantly closer to the
"disagree" category than the two groups of respondents earning less for
an academic year appointment.
Hypothesis Three (H:3)
As reported earlier in the chapter, the frequency distribution of
the respondent answers to questions 37-43 of the research instrument
seems to indicate faculty members IIdisagree" that collective bargaining
has been necessary to provide for the opportunity to determine
educational policies related to seven academic issues: (1) academic
standards, (2) curricular content, (3) degree requirements, (4) grading
standards, (S) standards for student conduct/discipline, (6) type of
degrees offered, and (7) the establishment of educational programs.
This position is further supported by thp. reported respondents'
comments.
However, from the statistical information provided by the analysis
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of subgroup means, (See Table XLI) a significant difference can be
reported between the educators' perception of academic collective
bargaining as providing an opportunity to determine institutional
educational policy and the respondents' (1) membership on a
university/departmental governance committee, (2) departmental
assignment, (3) salary, and (4) amount of involvement with the
bargaining process.

TABLE XLI
SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND EDUCATIONAL INTEREST ISSUES

Educational lnterests

N

Independent Variables

Average Scores

0) Governance Bodies
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Faculty Academic Senate
Finance
Rank & Tenure
Others

74
12
64
99

4.09**
4.12
3.68**
3.93

278
156
31

3.90*
3.96
4.21*

141
168
157

3.80++
3.88+

289
110
41
28

4.04+
3.77+
3.70
3.90

(2) Departmental Assignment
(a) Liberal Arts/Sciences
(b) Professional Schools
(c) Others
(3)

Salary
(a) $10,000-$25,000
(b) $26,000-$30,000
(cl Over $30,000

4.12+,++

(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Note: *:

No Involvement

Slightly Active
Active
Very Active

0.05; .: .02;

**:

0.05, ++: 0.001

(1) Membership on Governance Committee - as shown in Table XLI,
significant difference at the p < .005 level was found between those
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respondents reporting membership in the Faculty Academic Senate and the
Rank and Tenure Committee.

While the respondents who hold membership on

a Faculty Academic Senate appear to disagree that bargaining has
provided them with the opportunity to participate in the institution's
educational policy decisions, members of Rank and Tenure Committee
scores lie significantly closer to the "undecided" category on the
Likert Scale (Q

= 3.38).

(2) Departmental Assignment - In the subject institutions, faculty
respondents with an appointment in a Liberal Arts/Sciences department
disagreed less about the bargaining process as a positive factor in
providing for their opportunity to determine educational policy than
those faculty members with appointments in "other" departments in the
university system.
(3) Involvement With Bargaining - A statistical significance of
p < .02 was found between the sum variable, educational policies, and
the two classifications of slightly active and no involvement that
faculty members can select for their involvement in the institution's
collective bargaining process.

The respondents reporting a "no

involvement" on the Likert Scale produced a mean score indicating more
disagreement than their colleagues indicating some degree of involvement
in the institution collective bargaining process.

This difference was

significant only for the "slightly active" group (Q = 3.09).
(4) Salary - The respondents reporting their academic year salaries
between $10,000 - $30,000 statistically appear to disagree somewhat (but
significantly) less about the opportunities that the bargaining process
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has provided for determining the institution's educational policies,
than the over $30,000 group.
Hypothesis Four (H:4)
To further explore H:4, collective bargaining has provided the
faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with
the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel
policies of their employment, differences in subgroup sum score means
were analyzed.
As illustrated in Table XLII, significant statistical differences
were identified within the independent variables of respondents'
(1) age, (2) employing institution, (3) involvement in bargaining, and
(4) salary.
(1)

~

- The 60 and over respondents appear to perceive a

statistically significant less frequent opportunity to determine the
academic/personnel policies of their employment than do those aged 40-49
years.

The other age groups (30-39 years, 50-59 years) fall in between

these groups and do not statistically differ from either of the
extremes.

Overall, though, even the respondents in the 40-49 year age

range lean more to the "infrequently" category than to the "frequently."
option.
(2) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents' perceptions of
academic collective bargaining as a process to provide for them the
opportunity to determine academic policies on the average lie between
"frequently" and "infrequently" and somewhat closer to the latter
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characterization.

A statistically significant difference was identified

TABLE XLII
SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ACADEMIC/PERSONNEL INTEREST ISSUES

Academic/Personnel Interests

Independent Variables

N

Average Scores

0) Age
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

30-39 years
40-49 years
50-50 years
60-over

27
156
169
58

2.78
2.70*
2.84
3.02*

68
87
225

2.49++
2.74
2.92++

289
110
41
28

3.00**,++
2.65**
2.34++
2.22 ......

121
147
139

2.63++
2.80
2.97 ......

(2) Employing Institution
(a) Western Oregon State College
(b) Southern Oregon State College
(c) Portland State University
(3)

Involvement in the Bargaining Process
(a)
(b)
(e)
(d)

(4)

No Involvement
Slightly Active
Active
Very Active

Salary
(a) $10,000-$25,000
(b) $26,000-$30,000
(c) Over $30,000

Note: *: .005; **: 0.002; .+: 0.001

at the p < .001 level for two of the subject institutions, Western
Oregon State College and Portland State University, and the sum
variable, academic/personnel policies. While Portland State University
respondents lean closer to the "infrequently" category of the scale with
a mean-score of 2.92, (vs. 3.00 for "infrequently") those respondents
from Western Oregon State College lie almost exactly midway between the
"frequent" and the "infrequent" categories with a mean-score of 2.49.
No statistically significant difference was found for the Southern
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Oregon State College respondents.

However, their mean-score of 2.74,

like that of Portland State University respondents, is closer to the
"infrequent" category.
(3) Involvement In Bargaining - Statistically significant
differences were identified between the amounts of involvement that
faculty respondents select to have in their institution's bargaining
process.

While there was no significant difference between groups

indicating at least "slight activity," increased levels of activity
corresponded to increasing perceptions of "frequent" opportunities to
determine the academic/personnel policies of their employment (see Table
XLII).

For the respondents selecting "no involvement" in the process,

however, the process is perceived as "infrequently" providing those
faculty members employed in their

insti~utions

determine academic/personnel policies.

with the opportunity to

The differenGe between this

level of inactivity and all the other levels of activity ("slight to
very") is statistically significant (p < .002).
(4) Salary - A significant statistical finding at the p< .001 level
(See Table XLII) was identified between the two extreme levels of
respondents' salary range.

Those respondents in the salary range of

over $30,000 seem to perceive that the process has more "infrequently"
assisted them with the opportunity to determine policy than their
colleagues with salaries between $10,000-$25,000.

However, their

mean-scores are toward the "infrequent" category on the scale.

While no

significant difference was found for the respondents receiving an
academic salary of $26,000 - $30,000, their mean-score of 2.80, like
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those of the other two groups, is c·loser to the "infrequent" category of
the 4-point scale.

Chapter V
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter V presents a brief summary of the study, the conclusions
suggested from the results of the findings, and recommendations for
further research.
Summary of the Study
In the 1960s, the contemporary American university system emerged
as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influences, as
well as concentrated resources and a multipurpose capacity (Kerr,
1963).

During this period, faculty members were committed to the

concept of shared authority as the governance mode for the higher
education enterprise.

However, it was a brief golden age for the

traditional academic governance mode (Garbarino, 1975).
The mid-1960s brought a combination of external and internal
contextual factors to the university system, which impacted upon the
governance structure and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1975).

In

1966, one consequence of these events was the entry of collective
bargaining into the university system.

It was a process that was not

intended as an alternative to the traditional governance mode of the
academy, but rather a supplemental mode to support the advancement of
faculty governance rights (Polishook, 1982).
A dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from
the industrial revolution, academic collective bargaining, amid hostile

concerns and myths, has made enormous gains as a supplemental governance
mode in the 4-year private and public institutions of higher education
(Polishook, 1982).

It is a growth that has been assured by a

well-defined legal environment, which has established laws as the basis
for federal and state sector employee negotiations (Hedgepeth, 1974).
Academic collective bargaining, as the mode of governance adopted
by academicians to impose or reinstate independence into their
professional lives, has been confirmed by the scholarly works of such
educational analysts as Aussieker, Garbarino, Baldridge and Lee
(Schulman, 1979).

As Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979:

Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers
through the union contract.

Even on campuses where faculty

have enjoyed considerable decision-making p'Jwer, the contract
legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty
governance rights (Lee, 1979).
Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education supported faculty
members' rights for participation in institutional governance?
The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members with
an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of
higher education to evaluate whether or not they

perceiv~

the process of

collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to
participate in institutional governance.
the following problems were investigated:

To achieve the stated purpose,
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1.

Have the professional interests of those academicians with an
appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education
been affirmed through the collective bargaining process?

2.

Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians'
participation in financial planning and policy-making related
to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year
institution of higher education?

3.

Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining those institutional educational policies related
to academic issues?

4.

Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty
members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education
with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic
and personnel policies of their employment?

The popUlation of the study consisted of 694 faculty members
holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized
institutions during the spring of 1984.

Those faculty members selected

for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during
the academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for
a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track
appointment in the department.
Data for the study were collected from the population using a 56
item research instrument entitled "A Questionnaire to Study Collective
Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
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Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in
Institutional Governance," in three major areas: (1) Respondent
Information, (2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional
Governance Information.
Conclusions of the Study
Respondent Information
From the findings of the study, the results suggest that of those
respondents holding an appointment in an Oregon 4-year unionized
institution during the 1983-84 academic year: (1) the largest sub-group
have taught in a 4-year institution of higher education between 16 and
20 years; (2) the majority do not hold membership in the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP); (3) a large number elect to
have no involvement in their institution's collective bargaining
process; (4) the greatest percentage were in the 40-49 year age range at
Southern Oregon College and Portland State University, while the
greatest number at Western Oregon State College reported their ages in
the 50-59 range; and (5) the salary range of $26,000-$30,000 was
reported by the majority at Southern Oregon State College and Portland
State University, with a majority reporting a salary in the
$21,000-$25,000 range at Western Oregon State College.
Institutional Influences
The research data suggest that contextual factors influenced
respondents in all three subject institutions to vote for a contract
renewal in 1983.

Those contextual factors included (1) funding,
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(2) decision making processes/bodies, and (3) organizational changes.
1.

Funding

At all three institutions, respondents reported

reduced funding specific to: (a) state legislative funds, and
(b)

Instructional funding required for the development of

academic programs was perceived as a significant factor in
their decision to vote.
(2) Decision-Making -- Processes and decision making bodies related
to the development of institutional educational policy at the
state and departmental level of governance were identified as
significant contextual factors to respondents at Portland State
University and Southern Oregon State College.

Furthermore, the

data suggest faculty respondents at Portland State University
and Western Oregon State College perceived a decline in their
participation in policy-making decisions at a departmental
level as a significant factor in their collective

barga~ning

vote.
(3) Organizational Changes -- Two organizational changes: (a) a new
mission and goal statement, and (b) a new organizational
structure were perceived by Western Oregon State College
respondents as a significant factor in their decision to vote
for the renewal of the institutional bargaining contract.
HyPotheses of the Study
For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining
would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments
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in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in
institutional governance.
The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective
Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of
Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in
Institutional Governance," was used to measure the faculty members'
perception of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in
their university system, specific to four dependent variables:
(1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational
policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies.
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to
test each of the four hypotheses of the study:
H:l

The collective bargaining process has affirmed the
professional interests of the academician with an appointment
in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

H:2

Collective bargaining, as Unplemented in Oregon's 4-year
institutions of higher education, has provided for the
academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making
process related to the economic interests of the institution.

H:3

Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's
4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate
in determining the institution's educational policy on
academic issues.

H:4

Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in
Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the
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opportunity to participate in determining the academic and
personnel policies of their employment.
Although statistically significant differences were found within
each dependent variable subset of data, the four hypotheses of the study
as stated are rejected.

However, the results of the study suggest the

following general conclusions specific to each of the data subsets.
Professional Interests
Respondents in the three subject institutions did not appear to
perceive academic collective bargaining as supportive of their
"professional interests." However, the data suggest respondents in all
three subject institutions tend to agree the collective bargaining
process has provided them with "a formalized structure and process for
institutional "decision-making." This is "a very important result of
academic collective bargaining, as identified by the scholarly works of
Lee, 1979, Nelson, 1982, and Baldridge, 1982.
Economic Interests
The aggregate data suggest that the greater number of respondents
do not agree that academic collective bargaining has provided for their
participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the
institution's economic interests.

This perception is quite different,

however, when viewed from the respondents' data as related to specific
subject institutions.

These findings lend this investigator to

conclude:
(a) The collective bargaining process is viewed by the majority of
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respondents at Western Oregon State College as having provided
an "increase in the importance of the budgetary/financial
affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and
planning;"
(b) A substantial number of respondents at Portland State
University appear to perceive that the bargaining process has
"clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in
Oregon's system of higher education" for their institution; and
(c) Academic collective bargaining, according to the survey data,
is perceived by the Southern Oregon State College respondents
as a supplemental governance mode that has facilitated the
issue of institutional "economic interests." Data from these
respondents suggest that the process has:

(1) clarified the

low salary schedules for those faculty respondents in Oregon's
system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the
budgetary/financial affairs committee's roles in their
university budget analysis and planning, and (3) strengthened
their input into short-range planning.

These respondents also

identified the process as having: (1) assisted the faculty and
administration to present a united agreement to the state
legislature and, more importantly, (2) increased their salary
and fringe benefits.
Educational Policies
Respondents at the three subject institutions do not agree that
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academic collective bargaining has been/is necessary to provide for
their rights as a faculty member to determine institutional educational
policies for the academic issues of: (1) teaching, (2) programs, or
(3) students.
Moreover, the respondents of these institutions suggest that these
rights have been provided by either administrative rules or a faculty
constitution prior to the adoption of collective bargaining.
Academic And Personnel Policies
While the data indicate that collective bargaining has not provided
the faculty members with opportunities to determine the policies related
to the academic duties or standards of teaching (1) assignments,
(2)schedules, or (3) loads, the process has provided the faculty with
the opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of
(1) dismissal for cause, and (2) grievance procedures.

For the Oregon

academicians, this is an important result of the bargaining process, as
Barbara Lee in 1979 concluded from her study: "The single most
significant effort of unionization was the promulgation of a formai
grievance procedure" (Lee, 1979).
Reconunendations
Suggested Further Research
Since the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education report was
published, educational analysts have researched the multidimensional
complexities of academic collective bargaining.

From these studies,
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scholars have confirmed the causes, effects, as well as the major trends
of the process, as adopted by the university system (Lee, 1979;
Baldridge, 1982).
This investigator, like other educational scholars, is convinced
that additional research must be conducted in order to empirically test
those collective bargaining issues in academia that are still only
reasonable hypotheses (Spinard, 1984).

Therefore, the following

academic bargaining issues specific to (1) the Oregon system of higher
education; and (2) an expanded academic population are suggested for
future research.
Oregon System of Higher Education
Within the 4-year institutions· of Oregonls higher educational
system, the following research appears to be warranted.
First, research could h.e conducted to evaluate the perception of
those fauclty members employed in the three subject institutions who
(1) have taught less than five years in a university system, (2) lack
tenure, and/or (3) hold a lower academic rank.
faculty population

The perceptions of this

about institutional governance might show a

considerable difference from that of the respondents of this study. As
the early research of Ladd and Lipset found:
Faculty employed in the lower tier of academia

in terms of

scholarly benefits, financial resources, and economic benefits
-- and those who are in the lower ranks, lack tenure, and who
are younger are much more likely to favor organized collective
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action (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).
Second, the aggregate data of the study showed the greater number
of respondents in the three subject institutions elect nonparticipation
in the institutional bargaining process.

However, this study found

statistically significant differences between the degree of the
respondents' involvement in the process and their perceptions of
academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode.
Therefore, a question for further research could be, "If academic
collective bargaining has been selected by the faculty members as a
supplemental governance mode for the institution, why do they not elect
to be an active participant in the process?"
Third, a major trend of academic collective bargaining has been to
serve the economic concerns of the faculty.

In addition, it should

provide for faculty involvement in budgeting decisions, which are
critical to assure the establishment of academic goals consistent with
academic values (Mason, 1982).

A study could be conducted that would

compare those faculty members employed in Oregon's three unionized
institutions with the faculty of the five non-unionized 4-year
institutions on economic issues.

More precisely, this study would focus

on those issues specific to (1) salary and (2) budgetary planning of the
institutions.
Fourth, this research study suggests that the Southern Oregon State
College respondents appear to have a positive attitude toward academic
collective bargaining as a facilitator of their rights to participate in
the governance process.

Southern Oregon State College respondents,
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unlike those at Western Oregon State College and Portland State
University, are represented by an independent bargaining agent.
Therefore, a research study could be designed to study the question, "Do
respondents' attitudes toward their bargaining agent influence their
perceptions of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode?"
Fifth, and of particular interest to the investigator, would be a
study to identify those contextual factors, as well as the academic
governance structures and relations, which influenced the faculty
members at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University, in 1977
and 1983 respectively, to defeat a union coalition.
An Expanded Population

The investigator has extensively reviewed the literature in order
to identify the scope of research that has been conducted on academic
collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode.

This study,

like many reviewed, limits the survey to a specific geographical
population. Therefore, it is recommended that this study be replicated
using a larger number of 4-year institutions of higher education, in
order to have more generalized data about faculty members' perceptions
of academic collective bargaining to answer the research questions of
the study: Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode supported faculty members' rights for participation in
institutional governance?
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Closing Sunnnary
This chapter has provided a sunnnary of the study, a discussion of
the conclusions suggested from the findings of the study ,specific to
the three major areas of the research study: (1) respondent information,
(2) institutional influences, and (3) institutional governance
information.

In addition, recommendations were made for further

research to answer the question, Has academic collective bargaining, as
a supplemental governance mode, supported faculty members' rights for
partic.ipation in institutional governance?
To sum up, this investigator concurs with the statement of Ernest
Benjamin, the new American Association of University Professors General
Secretary, that:
Bargaining is not a substitute for governance.

Rather,

collective bargaining provides a foundation for the defense of
governance as the tightened academic market both lessens the
bargaining power of individual faculty and increases the
pressure on administration to subordinate academic and
external priorities.

Faculty will continue to pursue --

through agreement, litigation, or legislation -- the right to
bargain (Benjamin, 1984).
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A Questionnaire to Study
Collec tive Bargaining As
A Process Adopted In Oregon s
Four-Year Institutions Of Higher
Education to Support Faculty Members
Participation in Institutional Governance
A.

~

Questionnaire

Respondent Information
Please read each statement carefully
Check the answer(s) for each item as it be.t applies
to you as a full-time faculty member in your univer.ity system during the 1983-1984 academic
year
I

How many years have you taught full time in a four-year institution of higher education?
a
b.
c·
d
e.
f

2

Are you a member of
a.
b

[
[
[
[
[
[

1-4 years
5-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
Over 25 years
AAUP? .

Yes
No

For the 1983-84 academic year
a
b

c
d

4

a
c
d

000
000
000
000

e.
f

g

$31 000-$35 000
$36 000-$40 000
Over $40 000

Faculty Academic Senate
Finance Committee
Rank and Tenure Committee
Other policy-making Committee

Spec ify

[
[
[
[

What is your age range?
a

20-29

b.

30-39

c.

40-49
50-59
60 or above

d.
e·
O.

000-$15
000-S20
000-S25
000-$30

salary

During the 1983-1984 academic year are you serving as a member of one or more of the
university/departmental academic governing bodies listed below?
b

5.

S10
$16
$21
$26

indicate the range below for your 9 months

How involved have you been with the collective bargaining process in your institution?
a
b
c·
d

Slightly active
Active
'/eryactive
~o involvement

]
]
]
]
]
]
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II

Institutional

rnfluence~

Listed below are factors that might influence a faculty member to select collective bargaining
Please read each statement carefully
Decide whether you strongly agree agree are
undecided. disagree or strongly disagree that the factor raised below influenced you as a faculty member to vote for the renewal of the collective bargaining contract for your institution
in June of 1983
Strongly
Agree
The institution was experiencing a decline
in student enrollment
8.

State legislature funding was reduced for
your institution.

9

Federal funds appropriated for research have
been reduced.

10

The structural size of the institution had
grown rapidly during the preceding five years

11

Limited institutional funds have decreased the
development of academic programs.

12

The central administration had experienced a
reduced autonomy in policy-making deCisions
for the institution.

13

The educational policy decision-making rights
of the institution s central administration
were controlled by the state educational agency

14

The faculty academic senate/council has become
less effective as a governance body

15

There was a decline in the faculty members
influence on policy decision-making at the
departmental level

16.

There was a reduced sense of collegiality
among the facul ty

17

Student power has increased on the campus

18.

The institution has developed and implemented
a new mission and goal statements

19

The institution has designed and implemented
a new organizational structure.

Agree

Undecided

Oisagree

Strongly
Disolgree
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tIl
A

Institutional Governance Information
Professional tnterests

cided

Please read each statement carefully
Decide whether you strongly agree agree are undedisagree or .trongly disagree that academic collective bargaining has provided you with'
Strongly
Agree

20

An academic milieu supportive of the intellectual pursuit of .cholarship

21

A collegial relationship with administration

22

A formalized structure and proce.s for institutional decision-making

23

A professional rather than employee
their role in the institution

24

An increased interest in the function and role
of the faculty senate/council

25

An influence in .etting institutional standards
for academic performance

26

Invol vement in the .el ec t ion process for the
appointment of an administrator to a centrai or
departmental administrative position.

27

The right to participation in policy making on
educational issues that have the potential to
affect public opinion about the institution

status to

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree
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a

Economic Interests

Please read each 9tatement carefully
Decide if you strongly agree agree are undecided
disagree or 9trongly disagree that in your instltution the collective bargaining process has·
Strongly
Agree
28

Provided you with a high public profile regarding budgetary issues in Oregon·s system
of higher education.

29

Clarified the problem of a low faculty salary
9chedule in Oregon 9 system of higher education

30

Increased the importance of the budgetaryl
financial affairs committee s role in university
budget analysis and planning

31

Strengthened your input into short-range university budget planning and decision-making

32

Provided for your input into the long-range
budgetary pLanning model of the university

33

Encouraged the university budgetary affairs
committee to link university budget planning
to the identified institution s academic goals

34

Assisted the faculty and administration to
present a united agreement to the state legislature

35

Generated additional money for the university
faculty salary schedule in Oregon s system of
higher education

36

Increased your salary and fringe benefits
package in the university system

[.1

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
0 isagree
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Educa~ional

C

Policies

Please decide if you .~rongly agree agree are undecided disagree or s~rongly d1sagree
collective bargaining has provided you with an opporcunity to determine educational policies rela~ed to the following academic issues:
tha~

Strongly
Agree

o

37

Admission Standards

38

Curriculum Content

39

Degree Requirements

40

Grading Standards

41

Standards for Student Conduct and Discipline

42

Types of Degrees Offered

43

Establishment of Educational Programs

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Academic and Personnel Policies

Listed below are academic and personnel policies which AAUP believes faculty members should
govern
Please decide if collective bargaining has provided the faculty members employed in your
institution with the opportunity to always frequently infrequently or never parcicipate in determining policies related to the follOWing issues'
AcademiC Duties
Always

2

44.

Teaching Assignmenc

45.

Teaching Schedule

46

Teaching Loads

Frequently

Infrequently

Never

Academic Standards/Personnel Policies for
47·

Facul ty Recrui tment

48.

Faculty Promotion

49

F acul ty

50

Academic Freedom

51

Dismissal for Cause (Just Cause)

52

Salary Scale

53

Fringe Benefits

54.

Grievance Procedures

Tenu~e

Support Services

55

Office Space

56.

Secretarial Help

Thank you 'Iery :nuch for parC1cipating in this research study
of the scudy?
Yes

No

Would you like to receive an abstracc

APPENDIX B
FINDINGS SPECIFIC TO THE 1969 CARNEGIE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION SURVEY
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FACULTY ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND UNIONISM,
BY PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REI-lARDS; AS
PERCENTAGES OF n (LAnD AND LIPSET, 1973)·

The 1969 Survey
Disagree.
no place on campus
for faculty collective
bargaining

Agree,
faculty strikes can
be legitimate
acrion

All faculty (60.028 respondents)

59

47

Quality of school at which professor teaches"
A (elite) (n = 19.089)
B (n = 25.224)
C (n = 13.110)
D (lowest tier) (n = 2,580)

53
55
60
67

49
44
44
52

Type of institu rion
university (n = 44,871)
four-year college (n = 13.020)
two-year college (n = 2,133)

54
61
67

46
46
49

Tenure
tenured faculty (n =29,853)
untenured faculty (n = 26,766)

54
64

41
53

Received research grants. last 12 months
yes [received grant(s)! (n = 27.966)
no (n = 29.778)

54
61

49
47

Salary
over 520,000 (n = 6,420)
514.000 - S20.000 (n = 15,567)
SI0.000- 514,000 (n = 21,-117)
under 510.000 (n = 15.312)

45
52
59
66

38
42
47
51

Age
60 years and older (n = 4.398)
50-59 (n "9.408)
40-49 (n = 16,113)
30-39 (n " 20.580)
under 30 (n = 8.607)

45
53
57
62
68

30
35
44
52
60
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HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCP. REVIEW Cot!MlTIEE
1982-83

TO:

Patricia Chadwick - ED

FROM:

Robert Holloway, Chairperson

In accordance with your request, the Human Subjects Research Review Committee
has reviewed your proposal entitled, "Collective Bargaining: A ~rpcess Adopted
by Oregon's Four-Year Institutions of Higher Education ... "
for compliance with DREW policies and regulations on the protection of human
subjects.
The committee {s satisfied that your provisions for protecting the rights
and welfare of all subjects participating in the research are adequate and
therefore the project is approved. Any conditions relative to this approval
are noted below.
Conditions:

cc:

NONE

Office of Graduate Studies and Research
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PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
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May 17, 1984

PORTLAND
STATE
UNiVERSITY
:l 0 ~ox

751

porllana. oregon

97207

Pat Chadwick, Dean
School of Nursing
University of Portland
5000 N. Willamette Blvd.
Portland, Oregon 97203
Dear Dean Chadwick:

office of
Instllutlonal
'esearch

503,229· 3432

Attached are the lists of faculty from Portland State University, Southern
Oregon State College, and Western Oregon State College, which you requested
for use in gathering data for your doctoral dissertation. The criteria
which were used in selecting faculty for the lists are as follows:
•
•
•

Hire date (Personnel Data Base element #27) prior to 12/31/78
Holds an academic appointment for FY 83-84 at a total FTE .50
or greater (PDB element #44)
Is on an annual tenure (tenure-track) or indefinite tenure
appointment (POB element #56)

The data base used for selection was extracted from the November 8, 1983
payroll tapes for the subject institutions and is the same data base which
was provided to those institutions for purposes of EEO-6 reporting for
Fall 1983.
Please call me if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,

~~~,+<~
Mary F. Ri cks
Research Assistant
MFR:gh
Enclosures
xc: James H. Beaird, Provost
Western Oregon State College
Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Acad. Affairs
Southern Oregon State College
Don E. Gardner, Director
Office of Institutional Research
Portland State University

APPENDIX E
INSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL LETTERS FOR DATA COLLECTION
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wosc
I.

Office or the Provost

",

May 11, 1984

Mr. Don Gardner
Director
Office of Institutional Research
Portland state University
P.o. ;Sox 751
Portland, OR 97207
Dear Mr. Gardner:
This will authorize you' to select a sample of
WOSC faculty from institutional tapes for use by
Ms. Pat Chadwick in her doctoral dissertation regarding
collective bargaining.
sl1erelY,

1/

J~

,
JHB/tn

Western Oregon State College
Monmouth. Oregon 97361
(503) 838-1 220 Ext. 271

.f'

~_

'\DL
..
~-=--~

James H. Beaird
""Provost

RECE/V,..O v
c 8

SOUTHERN OREGON
STATE COLLEGE

M"
·Ii Y .

ASHLAND. OREGON 97520

:1ay 10, 1984

Mr. Don Gardner
Director of Institutional Research
Portland State University
302 University Services Building
Fortland OR 97207
Dear :1r. Gardner:
Professor Walt Ellis called on :1ay 9 asking permission for a random
structured sample of our faculty to be drawn for a study being conducted
in education. Pat Chadwick will be doing a dissertation under Professor
Ellis which deals with faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining.
This letter is to grant permission for such a structured sample to be
taken w~ile protecting the confidential elements within the personnel
files and tapes.
I would appreciate recelvlng a copy of the results of the study when Ms.
Chadwick has completed it.

;Z;/~
Ernest E. Ettlich
Dean of Academic Affairs
pkj

, arFJe
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PORTL."".ND
STATE
UNIVERSITY

PO. BOX 751
PORTLAND, OREGON

97207

May

I am
The study
Committee
of Public

18,1984

writing to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research.
has been approved by the University Human Subjects Research Review
and by my dissertation committee chaired by Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor
Administration.

The purpose of the research study is to evaluate whether or not the adoption
of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's
four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for faculty m~~bers
to participate in institutional governance. Selected faculty members with academic
appointments at Portland State University, Southern Oregon State College, and
Hestern Oregon State College are being asked to participate in the study.
Please take 15 minutes to complete and return the enclosed questionnaire by
31, 1984, in the stamped, self-addressed envelope. All the information which
you provide in response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anonymous. The numbers on the upper right-hand corner of the questionnaire represent a
code, which will be used only to enable a follow-up on unreturned questionnaires.
~y

I realize that this is a very busy time in the academic year; however, your
response will assist in my research and hopefully add to the evaluation of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the Oregon university system
of higher education.
If you have any questions or concerns about the questionnaire or the study,
please call me at 283-7211. Thank you in advance for your time and assistance with
this doctoral research study.
Sincerely,

'S?'~.-<w

.,;r'"

cZ7 . . k/(.b

Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education

2~~~

Professor of Public Administration
Dissertation Committee Chairperson

PLC:bcD

Enclosure

APPENDIX G
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May 28, 1984
Dear Professor:
This past week , I wrote to request your participation in
my doctoral dissertation research. The study is designed
to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental
governance mode in the Oregon university system of higher
education.
As you plan your week of May 28, 1984, will you please
allow 15 minutes in your schedule to complete the questionnaire for the study? Thank you.

G;~ ~~/~

Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education
Portland State University
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PO. BOX 751
PORTLAND. OREGON
97207

PORTLAND
STATE
U,'iIVERSITY

June 4, 1984

Dear
Two weeks ago, I wrote to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research. The study has been designed to evaluate whether or not the
adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of
Oregon's four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for
faculty members to participate in institutional governance.
To date, I have not received your completed questionnaire; therefore, I would
like to once again appeal for your participation in my study.
For your convenience, I am sending a new copy of the questionnaire, as well
as a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire will take approximately
15 minutes of your time to complete. All the information which you provide in
response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anonymous.
If you have any questions about the study, please call me at 283-7211 or
my dissertation co~.ttee chairperson, Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor of Public
Administration at 229-3920.
Thank you for considering my request to participate in this doctoral research
study.
Sincerely,

~~..;..l! ~,~
Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education
Portland State University
PLC:bcb
Enclosures
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Respondent Codebook - Collective Bargaining As A ?rocess Adopted
in Oregon'~-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Support
Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance
CARD

COLUMNS

QUESTION

VARIABLE

CODE

A
2-4

B

Respondent ID #

Put Number

5

C

Institution

1. •• WOSC
2 ••• SOSC

3 ••• PSU

School/Department
of AppoLntment

1 ••• Liberal Arts Department/College
~ Sciences
3 ••• Professional School
4 ••• Others

E

Date of Response

Year

- 84
9 - No Response
Month - 05 May
06 June
07 July
08 August
9 - No Response
Date - 01-31
9 - No Response

13

F

Response Received
With:

1 ••• First Wave
2 ... Second Wave
3 ••• Third Wave
4 - No Response

14

G

Academic Rank

1 ••• Professor
2••• Associate ?rofesaor
3 ••• Aasistant Professor
4 ••• Ins truc tor
5 ••• No Rank

15

1

Full-Time Teaching

1 ••• 1-4 years
2 ... 5-10 years
3 ... 11-15 years
4 ... 16-20 years
5 ... 21-25 years
6 ••• Over 25 years
9 ••• No Response

16

2

MUP Membership

1 ... Yes
2 ••• No
9 ••• No Response

17

3

1983-1984 Academic

1 ••• 10,000-15,000
2 ••• 16,000.20,000
3 ••• 21,000-25,000
4 ••• 26,000-30,000
5 ••• 31,000-35,000
6 ••• 36,000-40,000
7... Over 4{), 000

D

7-8
9-10

11-12

Year 9 mo. Salary

2••• College of Liberal Arts

9 ••• No Response
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CARD

COLUMNS

QUESTION

VARIABLE

18

4

1983-1984 Academic

1 ••• Faculcy Academic Senate
2 ••• Finance
3 ••• Rank a Tenure
4 ••• Others
9 ••• No Response

19

5

Age Range

1. •. 20-29
2 ••• 30-39
3 ••• 40-49
4 ••• 50-59
5 ••• 60 or above
9 ••• No Response

20

6

Involvement With
Collective Bargaining

1. .. Sl1ghcly AcUve

CODE

2 ••• AcCive
3 ••• Very Ac cive
4 ••• No involvemenc
9 ••• No Responlle

21

7

Decline In Student
Enrollmenc

1 ••• Strongly Agree
2 ••• Agree
3 ••• Undecided
4 ••• Disagree
5 ••• Strongly Disagree
9 ••• No Response

22

8

Reduced State Funding

Code same as 7

23

9

Reduced Federal
Research Funding

Code same as 7

24

10

Rapid Five-Year
Inll ti tu tional Growth

Code same aa 7

25

11

Decrealled Development
of Academic Programll
Due to Funding

Code IIame all 7

26

12

Reduced Central Administration'II Autonomy
in Policy-Making

Code same as 7

27

13

Increalled Control of
Educational PolicyMaking by State Education Agency

Code same as 7

28

14

Academic Senate/Council
Governance Effectivenesa

Code same aa 7

29

15

Reduced Faculty Members' Code same as 7
Influence on Departmental Level PolicyMaking

30

16

Reduced Faculty Collegedity

Code same all 7

31

17

Increased Student Power

Code same all 7

32

18

New Inscructional ~111Ilion and Goal StatelIlents

Code same all
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CARD

COLUMNS

QUESTION

33

19

New Instructional Organizational Structure

34

20

Academic Milieu Support- Code .ame as 7
ive of Scholarship

35

21

Collegial Relationship
with Administration

Code lame as 7

36

22

Formal Decision-Making
Structure/Process

Code same as 7

37

23

Professional Status
Role

Code same as 7

38

24

Increased Interest in
the Faculty Senate/
Council

Code same

39

25

Influence in Setting
Code same as 7
Standards for Academic
Performance

40

26

Involvement in the Administrative Position
Selection Process

Code same

41

27

Participation in Educational Policy Issues

Code same as 7

42

28

High Public Profile Regarding Budgetary
Issues

Code same as 7

29

Clarification of Lev
Facul ty Salary
Schedule

1 ••• Strongly Agree
2 ••• Agree
3 ••• Undecided
4 ••• Disagree
5 ••• Strongly Disagree
9 ••• No Response

44

30

Importance of a
Code ,ame as 29
Budgetary/Financial
Committee in university Analysia/Planning

45

31

Input into Short-Range
Budgetary Planning

Code same as 29

46

32

Input into the Long
Range Budgetary
Planning Model

Code same as 29

47

33

Linkage of University
Budgetary Planning to
Academic Goals

Code same as 29

48

34

United Faculty & Administration Budgetary
Agreement to State
Legislature

Code same as 29

43

VARtABLE

CODE
Code same as 7

as

as

7

7
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COLUMNS

QUESTION

49

35

Increased Funding for
the Fsculty Salary
Schedule

50

36

Increased Faculty Salary Code same as 29
and Fringe Benefit
Packages

51

37

Admission Standards

Code same as 29

52

38

Curriculum Content

Code same as 29

53

39

Degree Requirements

Code same as 29

54

40

Grading Standards

Code same as 29

55

41

Standards for Student
Conduct/Discipline

Code same as 29

56

42

Types of Degrees Offered Code same as 29

57

43

Establishment of Educational Program

Code same as 29

58

44

Teaching Aaa1gnment

L ••• Alvays
2 ••• Frequently
3 ••• Infrequently
4 ••. Never
9 ••• No Response

59

45

Teaching Schedule

Code same as 44

60

46

Teaching Load

Code same as 44

61

47

Faculty Recruitment

Code same as 44

62

48

Faculty Promotion

Code same as 44

63

49

F acul ty Tenure

Code same as 44

64

50

Academic Freedom

Code same as 44

65

51

Dismissal for Just
Cause

Code same as 44

66

52

Salary Scale

Code same as 44

67

53

Fringe Benefi ts

Code same as 44

68

54

Grievance Procedures

Code same as 44

69

55

Office Space

Code same as 44

70

56

Secretarial Help

Code same as 44

71

57

Abstract Request

1. •. Yee
2 ••• No
9 ••• No Response

Draft #4
9/26/84

VARIABLE

CODE
Code same as 29
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TABLE XXIV
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
INFLUENCES RELATED TO THEIR DECISION-MAKING
TO VOTE FOR A 1983 CONTRACT RENEWAL
Frequency
Strongly
Agree

Institutional [nfluences

N

("I.)

Agree
N

(7,)

Undecided
N

('/,)

Disagree

!!

("I.)

Strongly
Disagree
N

('/,)

Statements

26

(6.27,)

109 (26.0)'/,

66 (15. S'/,)

157 (37.1%)

168 (39.2'/,)

30

32

(7.6"1.)

88 (21.0'/,)

III (26,5'/,)

114 (27.27,)

16

(3.9'/,)

62 (15.1%)

81 (19. 7'/,)

152 (36.9'!,)

101

(2~.5~·.1

125 (29.67,)

177 (41.87,)

47 (11. 1%)

Il.~:\)

26

(6. 2~;)

(B.47,)

93 ( 22.5"1.)

107 (25.77.)

118 (28.3'/,)

64 ( 15.4'/,)

98 (23.4"1.)

107 (25.57.)

42 (

10.0~·,)

76 (18.1'/.)

102 (24 .2~',)

35

(8. J~.)

132 (31.5'/,)

7.

The institution was
experiencing a decline in student enrollment.

B.

State legislative
funding was reduced
for your institution.

9.

Federal funding appropriated for research
have been reduced.

10.

The .tructural size of
the instltution had
gro"," rapidly during
the preceding fiscal
year.

11.

Li.mited institutional
funds have decreased
the development of
academic programs.

12.

The een tra 1 admlnistration had experienced a reduced autonomy in pol icy",aking dec i5ions
for the institution.

35

13.

The educational pollcy decision-making
rtghts of the in 5 t itution's central adminis~ration were
con tro lied by the
5ta te educational
agency.

48 ( 11.57.)

14.

The facul ty academic
senate/council has
become les s effective
as a governance body.

59 ( 14.0%)

149 (35.:''1.)

15.

There was a dec 1 ine
in the facul ty members' inf luence on
pollcy-maktng deciSions at the departmen tal level.

71 (16.97,)

127 (30.n)

16.

There was
reduced
sense of collegiality among the faculty.

72 ( 17.1'/.)

IL.8 (35.1'/,)

61 ( 14.5'1.)

99 ( 23. 5~'.)

17.

Stuaent power has increased on the campus.

(0.57.)

43 ( 10. 2~~)

70 (16.67.)

198 (:.7.01.)

•

124 (29.67.)

41

(7.1'/,)

(9.7%)

40

48 (

128

(9.5"1.)

(30.4~~)

86 (20.S',,)

(6.6~·,)

2B

74 (17.

7~',)

54 ( 12.S·.)

42

\ lO.J-.)

lOB (25. ;%)
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Tab Ie XXIV (continued)

frequency
Strongly
Agree

In9titutional lnf luences

N

(",)

Agree
N

(~, )

Undecided

!!.

("I.)

Disagree
N

("I.)

Strongly
Disagree

!!.

("I.)

Statements

18.

The institutlon has
developed and imp lemen ted a new ml5sion
and goal statement.

12

( 2.9"1.)

96 (22.9"1.)

1I2 (26. no)

135 (32.2"/.)

61 ( 15.37,)

19.

The instLtution has
designed and imp lemented a new organizational strue ture.

25

( 6.0'/,)

125 (29.9',,)

102 (24.4"1.)

111 (26.6'/,)

55 ( l3 .27,)

APPENDIX J
TABLE XXX: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THEIR PROFESSIONAL
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

,

IAIII.E XXX
FACUI.TY MEHnER!)'

PERCEI'TIUNS of ACAm:tHC CULl.ECII Vi'::

IIAH(;AININ(;'S IHI'A.:r ON TllclH PHIlFcSSIUNAI.

INTEHESTS IN INSllTlJTlUNAL GUVERNANCE
frequency

Strongly
Agree
!! (7.)

lll~il ltul itlllal (;OVt.:'rnall~c
Pn)icSSlollal inlerest!>

:.W.

Au ul.'ddcmic mi I lell Huppur Livt!
of lilt' inlellecLu ..." pursuil

Agree

!:l.

(7.)

N

lIndcc idcd
(7.)

01sagree

!:l.

(7.)

n.)

12

(2.~7.)

HI (18.37.)

8~

II

(2.37.)

8U (lb. 77..)

61 (14.07.) 2U2 (42.37.)

(11.Y7.)

184 (38.

Strongly
Disagree
(7.)

Total
Re~pondentH

N

lUI

(22.~7.)

41~

of scholarship.
21.

A collegial rclaliolls1lip
Willi

22.

III! (24. n.)

418

aliminiHI..-alion.

52 (I I.U7.) 174 Ob. 7"1.)

A formalized structure and
pruCeSS (or illstilutiollal

78

(lb.~7.)

119 (25.17.)

~

I (10.87,)

474

dccl~ion-making.

23.

A profe~s1onal. rathe. than
employee, status to lllei..-

24.

All incrcd9cd

19

(4.17.)

9J (20.0'L)

85 (18.37.)

145 (31.2"f.)

123 (26.57.)

465

14

(2.97.) 104 (21.97.)

HI (I7.U7.)

IHI 08.07.)

Yb (20.27.)

47b

IH

(3.8·,,) III (24.S·L)

87 (18.27.)

162 (34.07,)

93 (19.57.)

477

21

(4.47.)

95 (lO.O·L)

81 (17.17.)

176 (37. I·'.)

101 (21.37.)

474

28

(5.97.) 122

(2~.67,)

90 (l1I.n)

153 02.17.)

84 (17.67.)

477

role In the instiLution.
IJllerc~l

functiun and role

or

in the
the fac-

ulty senate/coullc!l.
25.

An Influence in selling instl[ullOndl

stiJndards (oJ"" academic

Jlerformance.

:lb.

Involvement in the selection
prUCCti5 for Illc apl10inlment of
an aJminislraLt)r to a c~nLral
or dCI,artmenlul administrative
p061lioll.

27.

Ttl~ r1stlt Lo parliclpation in
pulicy making on ~ducatlonal i~
SUt·~

tliat hdve the potential

affect fJuvl1c opinion avout

to
th~

institution.

....
-...J

o

APPENDIX K
TABLE XXXII: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT
OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

TAtlI.c XXXII
FAClIl.TY MHllIlHS' 1'~:HCI:I'll(JN$ Of' ACADEMIC COl!.El:TlH lIAH(:AINING'S IMPACT ON ECONOMIC
INTEH£STS IN INS'flTUTIUNAL GOV£HNANCI:

Frequellcy

Slrongly
Int>tilullollal (;ovcrllancc

Agrct~

£conocuic Interests

N

(7.)

UndeAHrcc
N

(1.)

Dis-

clded
N

(7.)

N

agree
(7.)

Strongl y
Uisdgrt:c
N

Tol.,1
Respondents

(7.)

2tL

P.-ovlded yuu with II high pullitc
profile regarding budgetary l~
sues i.l Orcgoll's 5y~lcrn of hlgl,er cduccJ.lion.

19

(4.01.) 107 (22.77.)

III (11.2"1.)

193 (41.01.)

11 (15.11.)

47b

29.

Clard led the problem of a low
faculty salary fjchcdulc in Ore-

46

(9.77.) 169 U5.11.)

59 (12.57.)

Il5 (211.51.)

65 (13.17.)

414

16

U.47.) 150 01.117.) 131 (29.01.)

129 (21.31.)

40

(8.57.)

472

15

(l.27.) 116 (24.61.)

116 (111.2"1.)

1113 011.11/.)

12 (15.37.)

412

gon's system of higher education.

30.

Increased the imporlance of the
budgetary/financIal affairs committee'u rolc in university bud-

gcl analysis and planning.
31.

Strengthl!ncd your input into
6horl-rungt!' universIty budget

planning and decision-making.
32.

Provided for your input into
tllt! long-range budgetary planning model of the university.

12

(2.61.) 100 (21.2/.) 116 (24.67.)

164 (J4.61.)

79 (16.67.)

411

33.

Encouraged the university budgetary affairs cOIIInittce to link
univeraily budget planning LO the
identified insl1tution's academic
goals.

Il

(2.111.)

94 (20.17.) 1511 (JJ.II1.)

140 (29.91.)

63 (Il. 57.)

4bll

34.

Assisted the faculty and administratloll to prc~cnL d llnit~d dgrt!t!mcnt to ltle state le8i~laturc.

23

(4.111.) Il6 (20.11.) 119 (25.17.)

126 (27.07.)

67 (14.17.)

475

35.

Gencrat(!o additional money for

(1.77.)

36.

increased your salary and fringe
benefit!>: packLlgt.· in the university system.

the
university faculty salary schedule
in Oregon's syutem of higher education.

II

III (l.1I7.)

b4 (13.51.)

7J «5.47.)

IYl (40.67.)

136 (2!l.II%)

473

110 (2J.l7.)

7J (15.47.)

14b DO.1I7.)

127 (2b.81.)

474

.....
-..J

N

